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The global development architecture is undergoing vast changes, as emerging 
donors from the global South are actively entering the field of international 
development. The notion of triangular development cooperation has been 
brought to the forefront in discourse related to these changes, as it can be regarded 
as a tool to bridge the differing development practices of traditional and emerging 
donors. As China and Brazil are the most active emerging donors, this thesis 
employs the theories of neorealism and social-constructivism to explore how 
their approaches to triangular development cooperation differ, and offers 
 vi 
explanations to why China has been a less active partner than Brazil in triangular 
development cooperation.  
By examining the modalities, motivations and actors in triangular development 
cooperation involving China and Brazil, the thesis finds that China’s approach to 
triangular development cooperation is best understood through a hybrid of 
neorealism and social-constructivism, while Brazil’s approach is best understood 
through a lens of social-constructivism.  
China’s less active role in triangular development cooperation stems from the 
governance of its development regime being very state-centered, non-flexible, 
and structured around interest-based diplomacy, where it focuses on bilateral 
cooperation that reaps direct material gains. China shows less interest than Brazil 
in shaping global governance of international development aid through triangular 
development cooperation, as it seeks to highlight its own China model as an 
alternative model for development. However, it is eager to take part in triangular 
development cooperation in cooperation with international organisations, as it 
gives it the opportunity to enhance an image of itself as a responsible and active 
actor in international forums.  
Brazil’s development regime, on the other hand, is far more pluralised than 
China’s, with a variety of actors taking part in a diverse range of trilateral projects 
 vii 
in many sectors and regions. Its value-based diplomacy sees it actively participate 
in international development cooperation to promote the values of the global 
South, to shape the new norms and institutions of the global aid architecture, and 
to construct an identity of itself as an important global actor.  
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최근 남방 개발도상국 (Global South)이 국제개발분야에 적극적으로 진입하면서 
국제개발협력 체계에 광대한 변화가 일고 있다. 이러한 변화 속에서 
삼각개발협력은 전통적 공여국과 신흥 공여국 간의 차이를 좁히기 위한 도구로 
각광받아 왔다. 본 논문은 신흥 공여국 중 가장 적극적인 중국과 브라질의 
삼각개발협력에 대한 접근방식에 어떠한 차이점을 보이고 있는지 신현실주의 
(Neorealism)와 사회구성주의(Social-Constructivism) 이론을 바탕으로 
분석하며, 중국이 브라질에 비해 삼각개발협력에 소극적인 이유를 제시한다. 
본 논문은 중국과 브라질의 삼각개발협력 양상, 동기, 그리고 관련된 협력 
참여국에 대한 연구를 통해 신현실주의와 사회구성주의를 혼합한 관점이 
중국의 삼각개발협력 접근법을 가장 잘 설명할 수 있는 이론적 틀이며, 브라질의 
경우 사회구성주의 관점이 가장 부합함을 시사한다. 
중국이 삼각개발협력에 적극적으로 나서지 않는 이유는 중국의 개발정책이 
국가 중심적이고 유연성이 떨어지며, 또한 이해관계에 기반한 외교, 즉 직접적인 
물질적 이익을 거둘 수 있는 양자 협력에 기반을 둔 외교를 중심으로 구성되어 
있다는 측면을 들 수 있다. 브라질에 비해 중국은 삼각개발협력을 통한 
국제개발원조의 글로벌 거버넌스 형성에 대해 비교적 소극적인 모습을 보이고 
있는데, 이는 대안적 발전모델로써 ‘중국 모델 (China Model)’을 강조하려는 
의도로 볼 수 있다. 반면 중국은 국제기구와의 협력을 통한 삼각개발협력에 
대해서는 국제무대에서 책임감 있고 적극적인 일원임을 강조함으로써 국가 
이미지를 제고할 수 있다는 점을 인식하여 관심을 보이고 있다. 
 ix 
한편 브라질의 경우, 다양한 관계자들이 여러 산업 및 지역에서 삼자협력 
프로젝트에 참여하는 등 중국에 비해 다원화된 경향을 보인다. 또한 브라질은 
가치기반 외교를 통해 남방 개발도상국 고유의 가치관을 확산시키고, 
국제원조체계의 새로운 규범 및 제도를 형성에 기여하며, 더 나아가 세계무대의 
주요 행위자로서의 정체성을 확립하기 위한 노력을 기울이고 있다. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis explores the changing field of development, with focus on triangular 
cooperation between OECD-DAC donors / multilateral development organisations, 
emerging economies and beneficiaries. The notion of triangular cooperation has been 
brought to the forefront of many development cooperation initiatives, as it could act as 
a tool to bridge the diverging paradigms towards development that have been forming 
between DAC donors, also known as ‘traditional donors’, vis-à-vis emerging economies, 
who follow practices of South-South cooperation. This thesis focuses on the differing 
approaches of China and Brazil, two of the most significant South-South donors, towards 
triangular development cooperation, and seeks to understand why Brazil has taken a 
more active role towards triangular development cooperation than China. 
 
As development cooperation is evolving and seeing a vast amount of changes and new 
practices, it must be noted that triangular development cooperation is just one facet of 
the complex industry of development, whose boundaries as a field of academic research 
are becoming increasingly indistinguishable.  While there is an abundance of literature 
and articles in academic journals that discuss the development practices of emerging 
donors that follow the notion of South-South cooperation in their development 
programmes, there is still a gap in academic research regarding triangular, or trilateral, 
cooperation in development. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to filling this gap, and 
to add to the academic literature of development aid. 
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Background 
 
The development industry has experienced vast changes in the recent decades, as 
emerging economies, such as Brazil, India, China and South Africa (often abbreviated 
as BICS) have visibly entered the development arena, which has typically been 
dominated by OECD Development Assistance Committee countries of the global North. 
These emerging donors, which not so long ago, were recipients of a large bulk of the 
world’s development aid, are now using their own methods and approaches to foster 
growth and development in the world’s poorer regions in ways that could be viewed as 
both competitive and complementary to those of traditional donors. The changes in the 
field of development clearly reflect the shifts of power in the international system, where 
emerging economies have begun to author their own approaches towards tackling global 
issues. These emerging donors have become more vocal in shaping the new forms of 
global governance in development, such as the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation (Seifert & De Renzio, 2014, p. 5). 
 
The emerging economies’ development practices differ most concretely to traditional 
donors in their win-win approach that is embedded in the idea of South-South 
cooperation. This approach puts emphasis on mutual benefits, reciprocity, non-
conditionality, non-interference, and other facets that reflect a horizontal, non-
hierarchical partnership between the emerging donors and the recipient country. The 
emerging donors of the South “transparently” recognise how their development practices 
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support their foreign policy objectives, whereas the traditional donors do not 
(Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015, p. 9). Moreover, South-South cooperation may 
include practices of ‘tied aid’, or resource-backed loans, where aid is tied to the 
extraction of certain resources from the partner country. Such tied aid practices are 
banned under the OECD’s ODA guidelines.  
 
Traditional OECD-DAC donor’s approach to development is based on the rule of law, 
democratic values, aid conditionality, and a typically vertical donor-recipient 
relationship that dominates their development partnerships, and the decision-making 
related to them. Moreover, OECD-DAC donors follow rigid guidelines for what 
constitutes Official Development Aid (ODA), while South-South cooperation follows 
no strictly defined framework or guidelines.  
 
As there is no definition of what differentiates development aid from other flows of 
resources and finance in South-South cooperation, it is difficult to derive how much aid 
southern partners provide to beneficiaries. Moreover, it is important to note that since 
there are no guidelines within South-South cooperation, as the notion is based on the 
idea of shared values and experiences, the emerging donors differ widely amongst 
themselves in their development practices. This is particularly visible in the differing 
approaches of China and Brazil towards triangular development cooperation. 
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Hence, the international development architecture is being challenged, as the emerging 
donors’ practices of South-South cooperation differ from OECD-DAC donors in all 
aspects, from the modalities and ways of financing projects, to the procurement 
guidelines, conditions, and systems of measuring accountability and transparency. While 
there are pros and cons in the development practices of both the traditional and South-
South donors, there has also been some evidence of their approaches converging in some 
fields. Triangular development cooperation is regarded as one of the facets of 
development cooperation that is testing the complementarity of these two approaches.  
 
The Notion of Triangular Development Cooperation 
 
While the emergence of new donors has brought many diverging practices into the way 
development aid is facilitated and granted to beneficiaries, it has also increasingly 
brought the concept of triangular development cooperation to the forefront of 
development discourse. The idea of triangular, or trilateral, cooperation is mentioned in 
a variety of high level policy papers by different development actors. However, 
triangular cooperation also lacks a general definition. This is highlighted by the OECD: 
“There are multiple descriptions of triangular co-operation in the literature but no 
internationally agreed definition. Understanding of the term has evolved over time since 
the first implicit reference in the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (United Nations, UN, 
1978). A recent report of the United Nations (UN) Joint Inspection Unit (2011) 
recommended the adoption of a common definition in the UN system, but this has not 
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happened yet. Today, descriptions take greater account of a wide range of partners 
involved in triangular co-operation, including international organisations and the private 
sector. Triangular co-operation can start in different ways and the division of labour 
among different partners is not fixed but constantly evolving” (OECD, 2013, p. 9). 
 
Triangular development cooperation is typically understood as cooperation between 
three partners, which “involves at least one provider of development co-operation or an 
international organisation and one or more providers of South-South co-operation (i.e. 
pivotal countries) to promote a sharing of knowledge and experience or implement 
development co-operation projects in one or more beneficiary countries. A common 
feature of many examples of triangular co-operation is that know-how, skills, 
experiences and resources from both developed and developing countries are combined” 
(OECD, 2013, p. 14).  
 
Generally, the emerging donor (pivotal country) “plays a central role” by “contributing 
expertise adapted to the context in the beneficiary country and more direct or recent 
knowledge of development challenges, while the provider of development co-operation 
or the international organisation shares their development co-operation experience and 
provides funds” (p. 14). These roles and the division of labour may vary, since there are 
no fixed responsibilities, as triangular development cooperation is arranged on a very ad 
hoc basis, with rules and regulations differing across triangular development projects.  
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While triangular, or trilateral, development cooperation has existed for a long time in 
different “bilateral, regional and global programmes”, it regained prominence in the 
2000s in development discourse (Piefer, 2014, p. 1). There are high expectations of it 
becoming the “new mode of delivering aid” that could overcome the “shortcomings of 
North-South and South-South cooperation by also leaving aside neo-colonial 
connotations” (Piefer, 2014, p. 1).  
 
Even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China, a country that has generally seemed more 
sceptical of triangular cooperation (McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012), issued a statement 
regarding the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, saying that, “the international 
community should also strengthen South-South cooperation, increase triangular 
cooperation, and encourage the private sector, civil society, philanthropic groups and 
other stakeholders to play a bigger role” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's 
Republic of China, 2016). However, there may be a mismatch with China’s statements 
and their actions on the ground. 
 
As China is currently the fastest growing donor, its reasons for low participation in 
triangular cooperation may be much more complex, rather than just based on scepticism 
of traditional donors’ motives. China’s development regime is very centralised, and 
government run, as both its state-owned and private enterprises largely follow the 
government’s vision in their development practices. Thus, China prefers bilateral 
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development projects, where it can promote use of a ‘China model’, and pursue whatever 
interests it may have in the beneficiary countries. These interests may be related to its 
foreign policy objectives, such as its One Belt, One Road project (Gu, 2015). However, 
China also has genuine interest in learning from partner countries, and improving its 
image as a good partner in development (Gu, 2015). 
 
Some experts find that there is reason to remain sceptical about the benefits, or ‘bridge’, 
that triangular cooperation could bring between actors in the field of development 
cooperation. McEwan & Mawdlsey (2012) find that emerging donors may see trilateral 
development cooperation as “a vehicle to co-opt” them “into existing hegemonies of 
development ideology, policy and practice, without a genuine dialogue about different 
approaches to development” (p. 1198). They highlight how this is clearly visible with 
the passive approach of China and India in trilateral cooperation in development, whilst 
Brazil is the only one “open to ‘trilateral’ cooperation”, although it also strongly 
emphasises keeping a horizontal relationship with the traditional donor partners 
(McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012).  
 
According to a 2009 report by the OECD, most DAC donors had taken part in triangular 
development projects, while Brazil was clearly the main partner from the emerging 
economies (OECD, 2009a). Brazil is a very active partner in development cooperation, 
as its aid portfolio is boosted by the vast amount of development actors within Brazil 
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that have expert knowledge across a variety of sectors and regions. China has largely 
abstained from triangular development cooperation with DAC donor countries, while it 
has been more active in UN led initiatives. China is involved in triangular development 
cooperation with the UNDP in countries such as Ghana, Malawi, and Zambia (UNDP, 
2017a). 
 
While China and Brazil follow differing principles of South-South cooperation, both 
countries have largely increased their presence in international development 
cooperation. Therefore, this thesis reflects upon their differing paradigms of South-
South cooperation, and analyses how the modalities, actors, paradigms, and motivations 
of their development regimes influence their differing approaches towards triangular 
development cooperation.  
 
The following literature review introduces the main historical, institutional and 
conceptual evolutions regarding the changing international aid architecture, which will 
serve as a backbone to understand what triangular development cooperation entails, why 
it is important, and the main actors surrounding it. Thereon, chapter 2 explains the 
methodology, while chapter 3 introduces the theoretical framework used in the analysis. 
Chapters 4 and 5 elaborate on the development models and practices of China and Brazil, 
respectively, and introduce case studies of triangular development cooperation that these 
two actors have been involved in. Chapter 6 uses the theories of neorealism and social 
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constructivism to analyse the approaches of China and Brazil towards triangular 
development cooperation. Thereon, the thesis offers answers to the research question, 
and offers concluding remarks. 
 
1. Literature Review 
 
The literature on triangular development cooperation seems to agree that emerging 
donors and recipients of aid “are playing an increasingly significant role in setting 
agendas, challenging current aid orthodoxies, and rearticulating development 
cooperation relationships between and within the North and South” (PCPP, 2011 as cited 
in McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012, p. 1185).  
 
A UNDP (2013) working paper describes the changes in the global aid architecture in 
relation to 4 major shifts in the international order. Firstly, it states that “the emergence 
of new centers of economic dynamism reinforce international development efforts”; 
second, “the intensification of global challenges calls for scaling up as well as leveraging 
of development cooperation around common goals and agreed actions”; third, “the 
transforming relationship among States, markets and individuals suggests different ways 
to deliver assistance”; and fourth, “the growth of new institutional actors strengthens the 
ranks of development partners” (p. 1). It asserts that “there is a growing need for 
consensus on the part that South-South Cooperation (SSC) should play in the larger 
international development cooperation architecture” (UNDP, 2013, p.1). This need is 
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echoed by development providers from both the traditional donor countries and 
emerging economies, and by beneficiaries of aid, and academics alike. Triangular 
development cooperation is regarded as a core mechanism for building this consensus 
between traditional and emerging donors. 
 
While South-South cooperation is not a new phenomenon, its strengths and advantages 
have only started to become more widely acknowledged in international forums after the 
turn to the 21st century. In fact, the UNDP (2013) acknowledges how SSC has been 
particularly useful in areas, such as “emergency relief and recovery after natural 
disasters” and capacity building in “social protection, education, environment, health 
and democratic systems” (p. 2). SSC holds a comparative advantage over traditional, 
OECD-DAC led, North-South development cooperation, as southern partners can better 
learn from the past experiences of other southern partners that have overcome similar 
developmental challenges. In this way, knowledge sharing is a core facet of SSC (UNDP, 
2013), which is echoed in a wide array of both official and scholarly work on triangular 
development cooperation. 
 
Nevertheless, the UNDP (2013) highlights that SSC should not be considered as a 
substitute to ‘traditional’ North-South cooperation, as the “technical and financial 
support” of the northern donors is still extremely important for fostering development 
(p. 3).  The idea of triangular development cooperation has thus emerged as a tool for 
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pooling the comparative advantages from both forms of development cooperation to 
promote development more efficiently.  
 
1.1 Bridging the Global Aid Architecture 
 
In 2005, the OECD held the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which created 
“quantifiable goals to enhance effectiveness” to be fulfilled by donors and recipients of 
aid, or by both partners (UNDP, 2013, p. 5). The focus of delivering these goals was put 
on traditional DAC-donors, while emerging donors and other actors were widely 
neglected in the international development cooperation architecture (UNDP, 2013, p. 5). 
While the emerging donors could neither be listed as donors nor recipients, due to their 
position being more nuanced and in-between these categories, their increasing 
importance in international development made it clear that they needed to be included 
separately in the international development architecture (UNDP, 2013, p. 5).  
 
McEwan & Mawdsley (2012) describe how the aid effectiveness paradigm was “under 
intense pressure” due to the “persistence of global poverty”, the erosion of commitments 
made by DAC donors, and what they expected to be the “high profile and measurable 
failure to achieve the Millennium Development Goals” (p. 1187). They note that there 
was a “legitimacy crisis of the global development governance regime”, where many 
development actors viewed the “norms and institutions of the mainstream aid 
architecture as irredeemably western-dominated” (p. 1188). This “simplistic 
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North/South spatial categorization”, or “DAC/non-DAC binary,” (p. 1188) within global 
development architecture needed to be addressed. 
 
While some commentators felt that the emerging donors would make gains in areas 
where traditional DAC donors have failed to reach their commitments, some saw the 
emerging donors with hostility (McEwan & Mawdlsey, 2012). They described countries, 
like China and Iran as “rogue donors”, who pursued “sinister agendas with the help of 
‘toxic’ aid” (Naim, 2007 as cited in McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012, pp. 1189). On the 
other hand, some commentators viewed the rupturing of the western-centric 
development regime with positivity, seeing the emergence of southern donors as 
rebalancing the governance regime of development, and as a way to offer recipient 
countries “alternative models and approaches to economic growth and development” (p. 
1189). 
 
Nevertheless, DAC donor countries, and other development actors began to adapt the 
development architecture to the changes happening within it. McEwan & Mawdsley 
(2012) mention how many initiatives were made by the UN, IMF, G8/G20, EU, DAC, 
World Bank and other multilateral institutions, to engage with the emerging donors, 
where they mention the OECD’s Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) as one 
of the most important initiatives. The WP-EFF was already formed in 2003, before the 
Paris Summit that had left emerging donors on the side-line, and it was originally just 
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for donors and hosted by the DAC. However, it “rapidly pluralized into a far more 
diverse organization within which many recipient countries, (re)emerging donors and 
civil society organizations” asserted “their voice and visibility” (McEwan & Mawdsley, 
2012, p. 1189).  
 
The inclusive nature of initiatives like the WP-EFF allowed for the OECD held Accra 
Summit in 2008 to fill the gap created by the Paris framework, as the Accra Action Plan 
(AAA) recognised the “positive contribution to international development efforts” of 
third countries with a “dual character” in being both donors and recipients (UNDP, 2013, 
p. 5). Thereon, a Task Team on South-South Cooperation (TT-SS) was created with the 
aim to “integrate Southern providers into the aid effectiveness agenda in a consensual 
and legitimate way, adapting the principles of the Paris Declaration to the reality of their 
cooperation traditions and modalities” (UNDP, 2013, p. 5). Moreover, the Accra Summit 
resulted in bolstered efforts to encourage triangular development cooperation, as 
initiatives like the China-DAC Study Group emerged (Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 
2015, p. 10). 
 
Finally, the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan, South Korea, 
in 2011, resulted in the creation of the Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation (GPEDC), which “represented a major breakthrough” for further inclusion 
of new development actors in the global development architecture (UNDP, 2013, p. 5). 
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This is generally considered the main forum for global governance of development aid 
today. It has been called “a turning point in the engagement of DAC member donor 
countries with a broader range of actors, both in reaching beyond government aid 
agencies and in engaging with governments from rising power countries such as the 
BRICS” (Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015, p. 1). Moreover, “the Busan Partnership 
document…was heavily influenced by important SSC providers such as Brazil and 
China” (Seifert & De Renzio, 2014, p. 5).  
 
Mawdsley, Savage & Kim (2014) suggest that the Busan High Level Forum marked “a 
substantive shift of power within the architecture of global development governance”, 
and a “paradigm shift in dominant constructions of ‘foreign aid” from ‘aid effectiveness’ 
towards ‘development effectiveness’ (p. 27). The ‘development effectiveness’ paradigm 
“elevates the role of the private sector and re-centres economic growth and enhanced 
productivity to the core of mainstream ‘development’ thinking”, more fully enrols 
“‘(re)emerging’ donors and development partners” and involves “more differentiated 
commitments to global aid targets and renegotiated ‘norms’” (p. 27). The ‘development 
effectiveness’ paradigm seems to resonate more of the South-South approach, where 
general development outcomes and economic growth are highlighted over specific 
development goals.  
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The shift from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness saw the development 
architecture go “beyond Official Development Assistance to incorporate a variety of 
international cooperation flows, including South-South cooperation”, while the 
recognition of “the multi-stakeholder nature of the new international development 
cooperation architecture” allowed for a variety of actors to “participate more actively 
and on an equal footing in the process” (UNDP, 2013, p. 5). Thus, the Busan forum 
brought together a “variety of state and non-state actors, private sector and emerging 
economies to the same table” (AFRODAD, 2012, p. 2) to create a comprehensive edifice 
for development cooperation that functions “under the principle of shared but 
differentiated responsibilities” (UNDP, 2013, p.2).   
 
The Busan Partnership Document incorporated South-South cooperation into the 
development effectiveness agenda, as reflected by Article 2, which recognises that the 
different nature and modalities of SSC results in different responsibilities for its 
providers vis-à-vis traditional donors, while southern donors are only committed to the 
“principles, commitments and actions…on a voluntary basis” (UNDP, 2013, p. 5-6). 
While this voluntary basis allows for the GPEDC to be regarded as platform for both 
formal and informal dialogue between development actors, it does not bind its southern 
members to implement any development practices. The document listed triangular 
cooperation as one of the main tools to increase the dialogue and cooperation between 
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the North and South, and “to increase aid effectiveness” by “sharing of knowledge and 
mutual learning” (Seinfert & Renzio, 2014, p. 6). 
 
1.2 Uncertainties Within the Global Aid Structure  
 
While the formation of the GPEDC can be regarded as a step towards institutionalising 
“North-South Dialogue”, uncertainties regarding its future role and the relationships 
between the differing development practitioners of the North and South prevail (Seinfert 
& Renzio, 2014, p. 6). Although the Busan Partnership document signified an agreement 
of a common future of dialogue and cooperation in international development, the DAC 
donors and emerging donors had differing understanding as to what the agreement 
entailed. DAC donors perceived the emerging donors as having “signed up…to a 
particular approach to development”, while BRICS countries felt that “they had merely 
signalled their agreement with some general principles on a non-binding basis” 
(Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015, p. 10). When the GPEDC became operational, it 
seemed that issues highest on the OECD agenda were prioritised (p. 10), which has fed 
into the southern partners’ cynicism about the ‘partnership’-nature of the GPEDC. 
 
As the basis of the GPEDC stems from DAC-led reforms, declarations and agreements, 
such as the Paris Declaration (2005) and Accra Agenda for Action (2008), it has had 
“difficulties in cementing itself as a truly global partnership” (Constantine, Shankland 
& Gu, 2015, p. 1). The most influential emerging donors, Brazil and China, have both 
 
 - 17 - 
viewed the GPEDC with scepticism, identifying it “with Northern interests and a 
continuation of the Paris agenda” (Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015, p.1). Their 
sceptical views on the GPEDC are also resonated in their cautious engagements in 
triangular development cooperation with traditional donors. 
 
Constantine, Shankland & Gu (2015) argue that the GPEDC has failed to sufficiently 
address three issues that are of concern to emerging donors: “political legitimacy, 
attribution of responsibilities and agenda definition” (p. 1). Regarding political 
legitimacy, the emerging powers are not willing to allow the GPEDC to be a forum for 
making binding commitments, as they see this role belonging to the UN (p. 2). Regarding 
attribution of responsibilities, emerging donors “fear that the participation in the GPEDC 
may increase the pressure on them to increase aid in order to relieve the burden on DAC 
member countries”, which would clearly conflict with the “key principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)” (p. 2). Regarding agenda definition, emerging 
donors are not satisfied with how the shift from aid effectiveness to development 
effectiveness in discourse has not been met with a similar shift in practice, as they see 
the GPEDC’s agenda reflecting DAC’s understanding of aid related to “concessional 
financial flows”, rather than paying attention to “key aspects of South-South 
Cooperation, such as the importance of mutual economic benefit…development 
knowledge and…sharing of countries’ own development experiences” (p. 2). Thus, the 
GPEDC has also been unable to make itself a platform from which triangular 
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development cooperation projects are born, as such projects seem to occur on an ad hoc 
basis. 
 
In general, the emerging donors have often felt that GPEDC has moved forward in “a 
spirit of ‘business as usual’ for DAC”, where they have not questioned or altered their 
own approaches, or initiated “a genuine process of mutual learning” (p. 2). In this way, 
Constantine, Shankland & Gu (2015) hold the pessimistic view that the emerging powers 
see GPEDC as an example of a “broken promise” of a horizontal relationship that “went 
beyond the boundaries of ‘North’ and ‘South’”, but “did not materialize, and thus 
represents a divergence between discourse and practice” (p. 10). 
 
It seems that the major problem faced by development cooperation between the 
emerging economies and traditional donors is a lack of trust. This is echoed by scholars 
(Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015; McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012), who assert that 
emerging powers are sceptical or suspicious about the motives that established powers 
of the North and West have in cooperating with them.  Emerging donors may see that 
the established powers are seeking to “thwart their rise”, in a context where they are 
growing increasingly resentful of “attempts to influence their domestic development 
debates”, and more likely to “take offence when they perceive that they have been treated 
with insufficient respect” (Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015, p. 2).  
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Emerging powers’ distrust of institutions, such as the GPEDC, relate to their suspicion 
that northern powers have an ulterior motive of re-enforcing their dominant position by 
inviting them to a seemingly ‘horizontal’ playing field on international issues. This 
mistrust is based on tensions rising from other spheres of international cooperation, 
where the division of powers between the global North and South are more highly 
contested.  
 
Constantine, Shankland & Gu (2015) find that particularly China is “much less willing 
to tolerate perceived criticism, interference or lack of respect than in recent past”, as it 
increasingly aims to “set the terms of international engagement”, instead of adhering to 
the terms decided by others (p. 2). This mistrust and frustration of emerging powers 
towards processes and institutions related to development being dominated by the North 
has led to the creation of southern-dominated or owned institutions and organisations, 
such as the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AAIB), the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Forum, and the Network of 
Southern Think Tanks (NeST) (Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015, p. 3).  
 
Nevertheless, while global governance in international development has its 
dysfunctions, the field of development cooperation has the advantage of being an area 
where it is often easier for actors to have constructive dialogue, and to agree on issues, 
than it is in many other areas of international relations (p. 2). International development 
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can thus be regarded a core facet of global governance, where countries like China will 
have “fewer fundamental disagreements with other countries” (p. 2). While countries 
like Venezuela “actively reject western dominance of the aid and development arena”, 
countries like China and India “cooperate selectively…on their own terms and with 
explicitly discursive constructions of aid and development cooperation” (p. 1194).  
 
Although more binding and resolute engagement in the GPEDC may be off the table for 
many southern partners, the area of triangular development cooperation may become the 
area where engagements are made between partners on a more ad hoc basis, which 
allows for flexibility in setting rules and guidelines of cooperation. The experiences from 
these arrangements may later sow the seeds for more institutionalised and regulated 
guidelines of triangular development cooperation that may one day be binding under 
international agreements or organisations, such as the GPEDC. For now, however, the 
lack of information and standardisation in the way data is collected make it difficult for 
development actors to draft such rules or regulations in a comprehensive and inclusive 
way. 
 
An OECD literature review on triangular cooperation from 2013 asserts that triangular 
cooperation has received an increased amount of attention, due to the advantages it 
brings in partners sharing knowledge, and implementing “projects that support the 
common goal of reducing poverty and promoting development” (OECD, 2013, p. 9). 
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Particularly the idea of ‘knowledge sharing’ has been brought to the forefront of 
development discourse, where triangular development cooperation is regarded as a tool 
for development actors to share their knowledge. Triangular development cooperation 
is regarded as the bridge to overcome deadlocks in shaping the norms of the new global 
development architecture. 
 
1.3 Triangular Development Cooperation (TDC) 
 
While triangular development cooperation has been receiving a growing amount of 
attention in the global development arena, it is in fact not a “new tool for development 
cooperation” (Chaturvedi, 2012, p. 5). There have been cases of triangular development 
cooperation as far back as the 1950s, while it became a more common facet of 
cooperation in the 1980s, when countries like Germany, Japan, Brazil and China 
partnered in triangular cooperation with beneficiary countries. As there is no strict 
definition or model of triangular development cooperation, this section will introduce 
the different kinds of models of TDC that have been used, after which the main actors, 
challenges, and benefits of TDC are described. 
 
1.3.1 Models of TDC 
Literature on triangular cooperation shows that “governments are the main partners in 
triangular co-operation”, while “international organisations are increasingly involved 
and they are including triangular cooperation in their development strategies” (p. 17). In 
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fact, around “two thirds of DAC members” are involved in triangular cooperation, with 
Japan, Germany and Spain at the top of the list (OECD, 2013, p. 17). Moreover, McEwan 
& Mawdsley (2012) note the regional aspect of TDC in saying that “most TDC initiatives 
involve pivotal countries working with beneficiaries/partners within their own region” 
(p. 1191). This is true for most emerging donors, while Brazil and China have been more 
active on a larger scale, in Latin America and Africa, and Asia and Africa, respectively.  
 
The OECD (2013) has identified four models how triangular co-operation is organised 
between a provider of development cooperation (typically a DAC donor or international 
organisation), a pivotal country (an emerging donor), and the beneficiary country. In the 
first model, an already existing facet of South-South cooperation is supported by a 
“provider of development co-operation” (p. 14).  In the second model, “a provider of 
development co-operation and a pivotal country sign a partnership agreement to co-
operate with a third, beneficiary country” (p. 15). In the third model, “a pivotal country 
joins an existing partnership between a provider of development co-operation and a 
beneficiary country” (p. 15). Lastly, the fourth model sees triangular cooperation as the 
initial point, where the provider of development cooperation, the pivotal country and the 
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Moreover, the OECD (2013) has identified two ways in which international 
organisations take part in triangular development cooperation. Triangular cooperation 
may be “a joint activity conducted by the organisation, the pivotal country and the 
beneficiary country”, or the international organisation may support an activity of South-
South cooperation (OECD, 2013, p. 19). The UN agencies, such as the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have been most active in triangular 
development cooperation (p. 19). Moreover, international financial institutions and 
multilateral development banks, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), African 
Development Bank (AfDB), and Asian Development Bank (ADB), to name a few, have 
taken part in triangular development cooperation initiatives (p. 19)  
 
While a UN report suggests that “the private sector and civil society are playing an 
increasingly important role in triangular co-operation…there is currently little 
information available on the involvement of the private sector in triangular co-operation 
and there are few experiences reported on CSOs participating in triangular co-operation” 
(OECD, 2013, p. 20).  
 
Triangular partnerships may involve a large range of actors from within the three 
different partners. For instance, a Japanese-Brazilian project in healthcare in Angola 
involved “two Angolan counterparts (the Ministry of Health and the hospital), two 
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official Brazilian parties…, three Brazilian universities, Japan’s aid headquarters and its 
offices in South Africa and Brazil” (McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012, p. 1195). This 
exemplifies the novelty of triangular development cooperation, where the framework is 
very flexible. 
 
Chaturvedi’s (2012) study of 260 triangular development cooperation projects identifies 
“four distinct practices” of financing TDCs (p. 21). These are as follows: “joint funding 
where provider and pivotal come together to finance different activities”; “parallel 
funding, where pivotal come together to finance different activities”; “provider funding, 
where pivotals get financial support from the providers to implement the programmes”; 
or “trilateral funding, where partner also joins provider and pivotal for funding of 
different components of their programmes” (p. 21). 
 
In the same study, Chaturvedi (2012) finds that from traditional donors, Germany and 
Japan have been the lead providers of triangular development cooperation. The study 
found that Brazil and Chile were the main pivotal countries that took part in triangular 
development cooperation with provider countries. China, on the other hand, has been 
active in participating in so-called “umbrella programmes”, where it partners with 
multilateral institutions, such as OPEC, UNIDO or UNDP for projects with a wider, 
cross-sectorial reach in beneficiary countries (Chaturvedi, 2012, p. 11).  
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In discussing the possibilities of China engaging with OECD-DAC countries in 
triangular development cooperation, Gu finds that “the UN will need to act not as a 
coordinator or framework-developer but rather as a broker and supporter of bilateral, 
trilateral or minilateral engagements to build trust and support mutual learning” (Gu, 
2015, p. 7). Gu (2015) asserts that the UN could specifically broker such contracts 
between China and DAC countries “within China's near-abroad and its SSC sphere of 
influence” (p. 7). 
 
1.3.2 Differing Perspectives On TDC 
Triangular development cooperation is often considered a way to blur the boundaries 
between donors and recipients, and to create a more horizontal relationship between 
DAC and non-DAC donors, which focuses “on development outcomes rather than the 
politics of aid” (Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015, p. 5).  
 
In the perspective of most pivotal and beneficiary countries, the benefits of triangular 
cooperation “outweigh the drawbacks” that it may bring (SU/SSC, 2009, as cited in 
OECD, 2013 p. 23). From the perspective of traditional donors, or providers, and 
international organisations, the advantages of triangular cooperation are that it 
“promotes mutual learning among the partners involved”; “builds on and shares 
developing countries’ experiences and know-how”; “helps scale up successful co-
operation activities”; “is cost effective”; “can promote new forms of partnership more 
adapted to development challenges and more responsive to increasingly complex 
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development contexts”; and “can strengthen capacities of pivotal countries to provide 
development co-operation, making relations between “Northern” and “Southern” 
providers more horizontal” (OECD, 2013, p. 23).  
 
Seifert & De Renzio (2014) also acknowledge these areas as “benefits” or “motivations” 
for traditional providers to enter triangular development cooperation. They assert that 
the northern donors see “their technical and sectorial knowledge, and… longer 
experience in international cooperation as their strength when it comes to joining 
Triangular Cooperation arrangements” (p. 12). Moreover, their higher disposable 
budgets, and human capital from decades of personnel training for international 
cooperation and development add to their strengths, and make them “attractive for 
recipient countries” (p. 12).  
 
However, the northern donors are not entering triangular partnerships simply for the 
altruistic purpose of helping developing countries overcome developmental challenges. 
Instead, their enthusiasm in triangular cooperation can be viewed as a “strategic 
positioning” towards the global shifts in the development architecture, where emerging 
donors from the south are taking an increasingly active role (Seifert & De Renzio, 2014). 
In this way, triangular development cooperation allows the donors from the North “to 
maintain institutional bonds with emerging powers that are graduating from being aid 
recipients, while at the same time demonstrating openness to ongoing changes in the 
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development cooperation landscape and responding to increasing questioning about the 
effectiveness of their past development cooperation efforts” (Seifert & De Renzio, 2014, 
p. 12). Moreover, triangular development cooperation also allows them “to enlarge their 
cooperation portfolios and indirectly sensitize SSC actors to the importance of 
international norms underpinning principles and procedures of effective aid” (p. 12).  
 
From the perspective of pivotal countries, the benefits of triangular cooperation are that 
it “provides financial support to South-South co-operation”; “strengthens technical 
capacity for implementing South-South co-operation”; and “creates opportunities for 
networking and knowledge-sharing with providers of development co-operation” 
(OECD, 2013, p. 23). From a more strategic point of view, triangular cooperation also 
allows pivotal partners “to show that they dispose of the necessary – political, financial 
and technical – capacities to conduct technical cooperation on the same level as 
established donors, without having to endorse their standards and procedures” (Seifert 
& De Renzio, 2014, p. 12). In this way, they can continue to pursue their own narrative, 
or “South-South rhetoric” in development, while being more influential actors in setting 
up and shaping development cooperation agendas (p. 12). 
 
The benefits to beneficiary countries has “received the least attention in debates on 
triangular cooperation” (Seifert & De Renzio, 2014, p. 13). However, from their 
perspective, triangular development cooperation “facilitates communication and 
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networking with pivotal countries”; and “provides additional technical and financial 
support from providers of development co-operation to South-South cooperation” 
(OECD, 2013, p. 23). As “the re-emergence of South-South cooperation” should “widen 
their choice of development partners and thereby strengthen their bargaining position”, 
triangular cooperation should also theoretically widen this choice even further (Seifert 
& De Renzio, 2014, p. 13). It is said to have the potential “to bring about more effective 
interventions that build on different donors’ strengths” (p. 13). However, this potential 
is yet to be realised, as only the future will show how beneficiary countries will “define 
their role in triangular arrangements” (p. 13). 
 
1.3.3 Comparative Advantages in TDC 
In triangular cooperation, southern partners hold a comparative advantage in their own 
experiences of overcoming development challenges, which allow them to adapt policies 
to the contexts of their southern peers in ways that ensure ownership better than 
traditional North – South relationships (UNDP, 2013; McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012). 
The southern countries also often share geographic, linguistic, and cultural ties, which 
can allow “for more efficient and effective delivery of development assistance” 
(McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012, p. 1191). However, the finance and technical knowhow 
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In this way, triangular cooperation fosters relationships among countries that are “based 
on each other’s complementary capacities and comparative advantages”, which in hand 
benefit a third country by generating “expertise and on-the-ground practical knowledge” 
(UNDP, 2013, p. 4). Triangular Development Cooperation is seen as a way to promote 
the aims of the Accra Agenda for Action, where aid practices and objectives are 
diversified. In this way, cooperation and sharing knowhow between different paradigms 
and practices may “improve aid effectiveness through developing better and more 
appropriate practices…while also facilitating greater dialogue and interaction between 
the three partners” (McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012, p. 1192). This kind of cooperation 
generates global public goods, which are increasingly important in the interdependent 
and globalised world of today (UNDP, 2013, p. 4).  
 
1.3.4 Transaction Costs in TDC 
There is “a general perception that high transaction costs are one of the main drawbacks 
of triangular co-operation” (OECD, 2013, p. 24). These costs are perceived as rising 
from the complexities of organising and coordinating work between partner countries, 
and the difficulties in planning, monitoring and implementing projects in coordination 
with partners who normally follow very different procedures in their development 
practices (OECD, 2013, p. 24).  The lack of clearly articulated “operational procedures 
and policy guidelines” can make “initiating a TDC partnership…extremely time and 
resource consuming for all partners” (McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012, p. 1195). Moreover, 
pivotal and beneficiary countries often feel that the priorities of provider partners “take 
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precedence over those of the beneficiary countries whose policies and priorities are not 
sufficiently respected” (OECD, 2013, p.24). 
 
Some supporters of triangular cooperation do however argue that TDC should reduce 
transaction costs, as the increased resources should theoretically improve efficiency. The 
argument for triangular cooperation states that “effectiveness can be achieved in a multi-
stakeholder cooperation architecture” (UNDP, 2013, p. 4). However, the lack of data 
regarding SSC and triangular cooperation make it difficult for development actors to 
find or share information on the experiences of other partners, and may result in missed 
opportunities for mutual learning (AFRODAD, 2012; McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012).  
 
1.3.5 Need for Standardisation of Practices in TDC 
There is a lot of room for improvements in the way triangular development cooperation 
is made, and it has been a topic of various meetings between “governments, non-
governmental actors, and academia” (OECD, 2013, p. 24). These meetings have noted 
that a higher level of transparency and accountability amongst the partners is necessary, 
as well as a recognition of the importance of ownership, so that “all partners “own” the 
activity and are involved from its inception” (p. 24). Moreover, it is important that 
triangular development projects are “driven by the beneficiary country”, and that such 
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For such improvements to be made, literature seems to call for standardisation of 
different procedures related to triangular development projects (see OECD, 2013; Seifert 
& De Renzio, 2014; Chaturvedi, 2012; McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012). McEwan & 
Mawdsley (2012) list problems identified in triangular development cooperation as the 
“difficulties in aligning legal frameworks, budgeting and procurement procedures, 
sectoral priorities, reporting criteria, management structures, monitoring goals and 
frameworks, as well as the availability of appropriately trained staff” (p. 1195). 
Moreover, they state that the “lack of clarity around the division of roles and 
responsibilities can create inefficiencies in TDC project implementation” (p. 1195).  
 
Thus, it seems necessary to create some sort of systemisation that could outline agreed 
principles regarding issues ranging from governance, coordination, monitoring and 
evaluation structures to fixed definitions, indicators, methodologies, and other standards 
in triangular development cooperation (OECD, 2013, p. 24). Seifert & De Renzio (2014) 
find that “neither DAC members nor Southern development cooperation providers 
appear to monitor and/or evaluate their TC activities in a way that allows for systemic 
analysis” (p. 8). Studies on TDC are mostly done by independent researchers, and not in 
a systematic fashion by international organisations. 
 
Discussions on South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation in international 
forums have suggested that a reduction of transaction costs, and increased effectiveness 
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of triangular cooperation, could be possible through mechanisms that improve, simplify 
and strengthen the operational capacities of partner countries (OECD, 2013, p. 25). 
However, partners diverge in their views on these issues, as some feel that triangular 
development cooperation requires clearly divided roles and responsibilities for partners, 
while others “stress the need for flexibility, believing that a strict division of 
responsibilities should not be applied beforehand” (OECD, 2013, p. 25). 
 
As global governance in international development remains rather fragmented between 
South-South providers and traditional OECD-DAC donors, it seems quite unlikely that 
such a standardised system will be put into place any time soon. However, ad hoc 
arrangements in triangular cooperation may work as a trial ground for different partners 
to find the best practices that could become universally standardised procedures one day 
in the future.  
 
1.3.6 Political Nature of TDC 
McEwan & Mawdsley (2012) describe the advantages that triangular development 
cooperation could theoretically achieve, while acknowledging how, due to the lack of 
data and empirical studies, “the strategic and political motivations of the different 
actors…are still poorly understood” (p. 1186-87). This makes it difficult to assert 
whether it really is an effective model for development cooperation or not. In what they 
describe as “the depoliticization of development, and assertion of supposedly universal 
norms and values”, McEwan & Mawdsley (2012) find that the “policy-oriented analyses 
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of TDC are generally reluctant to confront explicitly the inherently political nature of 
‘development’ and the uneven power relations between different actors enrolled within 
it” (p. 1187). In this way, descriptions of emerging donors often group the different kinds 
of southern countries in a “‘natural’ congruity” (p. 1187), which does not represent the 
true divergences between them. 
 
As the literature on triangular development cooperation is very much based on policy-
oriented analyses, and lacks in empirically-driven research, its political characteristics 
are left unaddressed. McEwan & Mawdsley (2012) state that “the interests of particular 
states, sectors and institutions within donor and recipient countries, the fundamental 
disagreements over the nature of development and the right route(s) to achieving it, and 
inequalities of power and agency – are invariably bubbling away below the surface of 
these debates, meetings and forums, but are rarely formally acknowledged within official 
documentation and pronouncements” (p. 1196). In this way, participation in the 
development architecture may simply be a façade, behind which “powerful nations and 
international actors define the agenda around their own interests” (McEwan & 
Mawdsley, 2012, p. 1197).  
 
An earlier section in this chapter described the scepticism in many southern countries 
towards engagement in the GPEDC and the new global aid architecture. Naturally, this 
scepticism is also evident in their engagement in triangular development cooperation. 
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Even though it is an ad hoc mode of cooperation, that does not follow any strict 
guidelines, southern donors may see triangular development cooperation “as an attempt 
to protect and replicate older patterns of northern hegemony, with the DAC bilaterals 
and/or northern-dominated multilaterals setting the agenda while pivotal states act as 
little more than cheap contractors, with beneficiaries as passive recipients” (McEwan & 
Mawdsley, 2012, p. 1197-98). In this way, TDC could also be regarded as traditional 
donors’ realpolitik, where they are merely interested in engaging with emerging donors 
due to their rising power status (McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012).  
 
What a lot of literature on triangular development cooperation and South-South 
cooperation also tend to overlook, is that southern partners differ very widely between 
themselves in their motivations to give foreign aid. The relationship between the pivotal 
and beneficiary country in triangular development cooperation should not be seen as 
“one of a naturalized alliance of mutual understanding”, since this assumption overlooks 
“the power and politics of development” that are also present in south-south relations 
(McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012, p. 1200). Beneficiary countries are sometimes suspicious 
of the motivations and intentions of southern donors, as regional hegemons “have to 
confront a degree of reservation, or indeed active hostility, towards their regional weight 
and power” (p. 1200). In this way, the issue of trust resonates throughout the arena of 
development within North-South and South-South relations.  
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As the benefits and motivations of triangular development cooperation hold a range of 
strategic, or political, foreign policy benefits, in addition to the altruistic deed of giving 
aid, there is a risk that its full potential of making aid more effective, and shaping the 
global development architecture into a more inclusive format, will not be met. Some 
experts fear that triangular development cooperation will just become a facet where 
northern and southern donors aim to show “their good will”, and desire to cooperate, 
without “actually providing better and more effective development cooperation” (Seifert 
& De Renzio, 2014, p. 13). 
 
Nevertheless, triangular development cooperation “constitutes a viable and practical 
means of forging new development partnerships between North and South in genuinely 
horizontal, respectful relationships” (McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012, p. 1197). Whether it 
is successful in forging trust and becoming a credible mode of cooperation remains to 
be seen. 
  
2. Methodology  
 
This thesis is conducted as a qualitative study. The research is based on a wide array of 
academic journal articles, think tank reports, official policy papers of governments and 
international organisations, and other primary and secondary sources.  
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This thesis is framed under the debate regarding the differences of development practices 
of traditional donors (OECD-DAC) vis-à-vis South-South cooperation. Moreover, the 
importance of triangular cooperation is framed under a greater discussion regarding 
global governance in international development, and how the emerging donors are 
engaging in shaping new norms and institutions in the international development 
architecture.  
 
The main shortcoming of the research method is that there is a lack of empirical studies 
and data on triangular development cooperation. Most of the literature is policy-oriented, 
and based on development discourse, statements of development actors, and other policy 
papers. To overcome this shortcoming, the thesis uses the international relations theories 
of neorealism and social-constructivism to analyse the approaches China and Brazil are 
taking towards triangular development cooperation, and the international development 
architecture in general. The theoretical lens allows for a unique perspective on the role 
of China and Brazil in triangular development cooperation, and the changing realm of 
international development in general. The theoretical framework is explained in more 
detail in the next section. 
 
This thesis asks the following research question:  
Why is China less active than Brazil in Triangular Development Cooperation?  
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The research question is supported by the following sub-questions: 
What are the main motives, modalities, instruments and actors in Chinese and Brazilian 
Development Cooperation? 
What are the similarities and differences between Chinese and Brazilian foreign policy 
goals? 
How do China and Brazil contribute to shaping the global development architecture? 
 
These questions will be examined throughout the thesis, as it introduces the main actors, 
modalities, and motivations within the development regimes of Brazil and China, and 
presents case studies of triangular development cooperation to exemplify what types of 
triangular development cooperation projects these actors take part in. Thereon, the 
theoretical analysis in chapter 6 explores the main differences between the approaches 
of China and Brazil towards triangular development cooperation from neorealist and 
social-constructivist angles, and explains why China is a less active in such cooperation 
than Brazil. The findings are visualised in the form of tables. This allows the reader to 
clearly distinguish the difference stances towards triangular cooperation taken by China 
and Brazil. Thereon, conclusions are presented. 
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Hypothesis I) China participates in triangular development cooperation when it 
increases its relative gains, security, and material and political power in the international 
arena positively 
 
Hypothesis II) Brazil participates in triangular development cooperation to shape the 
new values, norms and forms of global governance in development, and to construct its 
own identity as an active and cooperative global power that speaks for the global South. 
 
Hypothesis I is designed to test if Chinese reluctance to take a more active role in 
triangular development cooperation stems from a neorealist paradigm on international 
relations being a zero-sum game, where the competitive environment between states 
means that its actions in development need to align with its foreign policy objectives of 
maintaining or growing its material and economic wealth. As such gains are less evident 
in triangular development cooperation, China sticks to more bilateral forms of 
development aid. 
 
Hypothesis II is designed to test if Brazil’s active role in triangular development 
cooperation stems from a social-constructivist’s paradigm, where its strategy is to 
interact and cooperate with other partners to construct ideas and identities of itself as a 
strong southern partner that is active in creating and modifying facets of global 
 
 - 39 - 
governance. While Brazil donates aid for altruistic reasons, it also has its foreign policy 
interests at hand. 
 
These hypotheses will be tested in the very end of Chapter 6, before concluding remarks 
are made. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
As the development arena is seeing vast changes, where the relationships between 
development actors and within development discourse in the North and South are 
changing, it is extremely challenging, if not impossible, to find a theoretical framework 
that can accommodate and produce a comprehensive understanding of every change that 
is happening in the global development infrastructure. 
 
Piefer (2014) notes that “theory tends to lag behind practice, behind innovations on the 
ground and practice tends to lag behind theory (since policy makers and activists lack 
time for reflection” (Nederveen, 2009, p. 3, as cited in Piefer, 2014, p. 2). Piefer (2014) 
finds that “development theories and international relations theories alike do not take 
sufficient account of changing power relations”, as development thinking often sees the 
“theoretical debate…stuck in traditional patterns of Western hegemony over the less 
developed peripheries” (p. 2).  
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The last decades have seen a geopolitical shift from the bipolarity of the Cold War 
towards the unipolarity of US hegemony, and later, the multipolarity of today, where 
many global powers have emerged around the world, with the most notable ones being 
the BRICS countries (Piefer, 2014, p.3). These shifts in polarities have naturally been 
accompanied by shifts in paradigms, norms, geopolitics, and relations between different 
international actors across the board. This thesis uses the theories of neorealism and 
social-constructivism to understand the roles that China and Brazil play in these global 
shifts, and to analyse their differing approaches towards triangular development 
cooperation.  
 
However, it uses these two theories with care, as neither theory can fully explain the 
actions of China or Brazil alone. As Fearon & Wendt (2012) discuss in their paper on 
the rationalist-constructivist debate, these theories are not meant to be blindly followed 
in every circumstance, but they should be understood as methods, or means, to better 
conceptualise issues in international relations. In this thesis, these ‘issues’ are the 
differing approaches to triangular development cooperation of China and Brazil. The 
theories of neorealism and social-constructivism are introduced below. 
 
3.1 Neorealism  
 
Both classical realism and neorealism agree that the state is the most important actor in 
understanding international relations, and determining why wars occur. Morgenthau 
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(1955) introduces realism as a more robust, and less elusive theoretical perspective on 
international relations. He says that international political theory is divided into two 
schools of thought. One is “derived from universally valid abstract principles” about 
human nature (p. 3), while the other says these principles cannot be put into practice in 
the actual imperfect world, due to the very “forces inherent in human nature” (p. 4). In 
this way, realism offers a more empirical, rather than abstract, depiction of international 
relations, where ideas like the balance of power play a key role.  
 
The father of neorealism, Waltz (1959), created a systematised theory of realism to 
understand the causes of war, using three images of international relations. The first, 
resembling classical realism, focuses on human nature, while the second focuses on the 
internal architecture of states. The third image, which is core to ‘neorealism’, “focused 
instead on the competitive, anarchic nature of world politics as a whole” (Keohane, 1986, 
p. 13).  
 
From this neo-realistic standpoint, states are acting within an anarchic international 
system, largely reminiscent of a zero-sum game, where their sole prerogative is survival 
and maintaining their balance of power. In linking this perspective with development 
aid, Piefer (2014) notes that “states as unitary actors promote their strategic foreign 
policy interests through development aid (not necessarily development cooperation) 
…to enhance power and influence in other world regions” (p. 3). Therefore, 
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“cooperation on development issues would mainly serve self-interests in order to achieve 
relative gains on the international level” (p. 3). Piefer (2014) notes that both North-South 
and South-South cooperation entails altruistic rhetoric regarding development 
cooperation, while it is rather evident that such rhetoric is “used strategically in most 
cases” (p. 3). Hence, triangular development cooperation may just be about maximizing 
the power of two donors, while the effects on the recipient country remain unclear.  
 
It is precisely this neo-realistic perspective that this thesis will explore as the reason why 
China refrains from an active role as a partner in triangular development cooperation. 
The theory asserts that China wishes to exert an image of itself as a powerful 
international actor in international development and other arenas of international 
relations, as it prioritises development projects with clear materialist gains, and that 
benefit its foreign policy objectives. Moreover, it refrains from development cooperation 
in areas where its power may be undermined by other actors, or where its foreign policy 
objectives or relative gains are not evident.  
 
3.2 Social-Constructivism  
 
Social-constructivism, rooted in interwar Idealism, evolved during the 1980s and early 
1990s to counter the neorealist-neoliberal debate that dominated IR scholarship 
throughout the second half of the 20th century (Wendt, 1999). Constructivists, such as 
Wendt and Ruggie, argue that the international political order is socially constructed, 
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and based on ideas derived from human nature, values, norms, and behavioural patterns. 
Wendt (1999) says that states are agents with human-like qualities, such as rationality, 
intentionality and interests, and their different structures and identities cause them to 
produce different kinds of effects in the international system. Their ‘social nature’ makes 
them interact with each other in ways that can provoke changes in the international 
system as a whole. Constructivists base their argument against the relational, state-
centric, and “materialist lens” of neorealism (Wendt, 1999, p.4), which sees the 
international political system as a zero-sum game. They use constitutive explanations in 
trying to explain international phenomena, rather than causal explanations, which are 
advocated by realists.  
 
The social-constructivist position sees a “country’s foreign policy agenda…not only 
shaped by material, but also essentially by immaterial factors such as ideas, role 
identities, norms, and values” (Piefer, 2014, p.4). The identity of a country, the way it 
has adopted international norms (Wendt, 1999), “its own perception of how it is 
perceived by others”, and the roles it has envisaged for itself, are all “essential factors 
that significantly influence foreign policy” (Piefer, 2014, p. 4). In this way, “if a decision 
to cooperate trilaterally is seen as appropriate to the identity of an actor, cooperation is 
highly probable” (Knodt & Piefer, 2012, p. 34 as cited in Piefer, 2014, p. 4). In countries 
like India and Brazil, “there is a dichotomy between great power aspiration identity and 
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the identity of a developing country of the South” (Hurrel, 2006, p. 19 as cited in Piefer, 
2014, p. 4).  
 
This thesis suggests that Brazil follows a social-constructivist approach towards 
triangular development cooperation, where it sees triangular cooperation as a venue to 
shape both the new values, norms and forms of global governance in development, and 
its own identity as an active and cooperative global power that speaks for the global 
South. 
 
As the theoretical framework has now been introduced, the following chapters present 
the basic modalities and actors in Chinese and Brazilian development cooperation, and 
detail the differing approaches and motivations for triangular development cooperation 
of these two actors, with the support of case studies. Thereon, the aforementioned 
theories of neorealism and social-constructivism are used to analyse these approaches 
towards TDC. 
 
4. China in Triangular Development Cooperation 
 
4.1 Background on Chinese Development Practices 
China’s rise in power is being closely watched by the international community, which is 
concerned by how peacefully this rise will happen at a time when China’s expression of 
goodwill in one area may be paralleled by hostile actions in another. For example, its 
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concepts of “peaceful development” and “community of common destiny” portray an 
enlightened and cooperative China, while the increasing tensions from “territorial 
disputes in the East and South China Seas” show China as a more assertive and power-
hungry international power (Zhang, 2017, p. 1). Moreover, in the development arena, 
the China-sponsored initiatives, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
and the BRICS New Development Bank, can be regarded “as a direct challenge to the 
influence of existing providers of development finance, particularly the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank” (Zhang, 2017, p. 1). 
 
Thus, China’s hand in the global aid architecture is being felt, as it has initiated a wide 
range of discourse in the development community about the future of global 
development governance, and how to involve China and other emerging donors in such 
governance. For northern donors to be able to engage in (triangular) development 
cooperation with China, they must understand “the linkages between China’s 
development policy and its internal affairs” (Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015). As 
China is still settling into relatively new role as a major world power, it is going through 
ongoing reforms, and “taking steps to strengthen its power regionally and globally”, as 
exemplified by its launch of the Going Out Policy, AIIB, and the One Road One Belt 
initiative (p. 8). While such initiatives have not gone unnoticed by the international 
community, Western analyses of these advancements seem to be made “in isolation from 
China’s domestic situation” (p. 8).  
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In the case of rising powers, particularly in non-democratic regimes, such as China, it is 
essential to understand that external policies may be focused on the consolidation of 
power domestically. In a country without free press, and a one-party system, it is 
important to understand that Chinese actions on the world stage should not be studied in 
a vacuum unrelated to other aspects of its internal politics. In this way, Constantine, 
Shankland & Gu (2015) argue “for a more dynamic and relational approach that would 
allow China’s external policies and activities to be analysed in relation to its internal 
affairs and politics” (p. 8). Such an ethno-oriental approach would “require the ‘insider’ 
views of Chinese academics, scholars, practitioners and policy makers” to explore the 
“linkages between China’s internal development and its international/external activity… 
more thoroughly” (p. 8).  
 
To better understand China’s approach to TDC, it is crucial to have a comprehensive 
understanding of the main modalities, paradigms, and practices behind China’s 
development regime. While development discourse refers to China as one of the 
‘emerging’ or ‘new’ donors, it is important to note that China has a history of giving aid 
that “goes back sixty years to when Mao Zedong was giving aid to support other 
communist movements” (Brant, 2011, p. 7). However, the rhetoric of ‘new’ or 
‘emerging’ is a more relevant description when considering China's entrance into 
mainstream development cooperation, as its ‘Going Out’ policy, which started in 1999, 
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has seen it provide aid on a wider scale to areas that have previously been dominated 
almost exclusively by traditional donors.  
 
Although its rapid economic growth has allowed it to increase its development aid 
portfolio, and made it the second largest economy in the world, China is still both a 
beneficiary and donor of development aid. It continues to receive development 
assistance from international organisations, such as UN agencies, multilateral 
development banks, and decreasingly, from bilateral donors (Brant, 2011).  
 
As China blurs the distinction of what it considers as development aid, and does not have 
a systematic way of collecting data on its development finance, it is difficult to present 
accurate numbers on how much aid it provides on a global basis. However, scholars and 
practitioners seem to agree that China has largely increased its development aid 
portfolio, both in terms of finance and in terms of regions it provides aid to. The growth 
of China’s aid per annum averaged at 29.4% between 2004 and 2009 (State Council, 
2014, as cited in Zhang, 2017, p. 2), while a 2016 report by JICA noted that in 2013, 
China had surpassed the traditional donors, Australia and Canada, to being ranked 9th 
among global donors (Kitano, 2016, p. 29 as cited in Zhang, 2017, p. 2).   
 
 
 - 48 - 
4.1.1 Modalities of Chinese Aid 
The Chinese government released its first White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid in April 
2011, which outlined its “official aid policies, principles and practices” (UNICEF, 2011, 
p. 1). The White paper emphasises China’s aid as being “a model with its own 
characteristics” that “falls into the category of South-South cooperation” (p. 2). It 
outlines the need to further involve recipient countries in designing development 
projects, and to strengthen “international cooperation and exchanges and learning from 
good practices” (p. 1), which include trilateral cooperation (p. 3). 
 
Customary to South-South cooperation, “China’s approach to development is intricately 
tied to its own development, history and…position in the international arena” 
(Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015, p. 7). Western scholars often “fail to see the 
complexities and interdependences” of the Chinese developmental model, as they judge 
“the situation through their own historical experience” (p. 7). Indeed, the Western 
experience of development, and international historical context that saw its development 
take place, is very different to the ‘development experience’ of the global South that has 
largely been orchestrated by western donors, since the end of the Second World War. 
While the Western model is often seen as ideological, with a focus on social welfare, 
human rights and other democratic values, the Chinese model is more focused on more 
general economic factors (Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015). China’s own experience 
of development has caused its approach to development to be very pragmatic, rather than 
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based on complex guidelines and policy frameworks. Chinese development policy is 
very demand-driven, as it is “predominantly responsive to demands from state 
authorities within the developing world” (Constantine, Shankland & Gu, p. 8). China’s 
focus on bilateral engagement in development is thus based on state-to-state 
communication, where its embassies play a vital role in consulting with local 
governments to assess the level of demand, which is then articulated to the central 
government in Beijing (p. 8). 
 
Fundamentally, Chinese foreign aid differs from the ODA of traditional donors in that it 
“is characterised by a focus on infrastructure projects, mutual benefits, no political 
conditionality, respect of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs” (Zhang, 
2017, p. 2), which are core areas of South-South cooperation. China is known for its use 
of the controversial ‘Angola-model’, where it grants partner countries low interest loans 
that are tied to that countries natural resources, such as minerals or oil (Baker, 2016).  
These ‘tied aid’ practices see a lot of the finance that China gives at concessional rates 
return to China, along with the extracted natural resources. Moreover, Chinese state-
owned enterprises often execute these ‘developmental projects’ from start to finish, with 
little involvement of local communities, which thus renders it difficult to assess the true 
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Although the Western development discourse has had some impact on Chinese 
development practices, Chinese foreign aid is regarded as “more political…than 
developmental in nature” (p. 7). China closely links its foreign policy and development 
policy, and has economic tools to garner diplomatic support. For instance, “Chinese aid 
to Cambodia has soared to sustain the latter’s support for China in the South China Sea 
dispute” (Zhang, 2017, p. 2). In this way, China differs from traditional donors in openly 
using its foreign aid as a diplomatic tool of its foreign policy.  
 
4.1.2 Actors in China’s Development Regime 
Chinese development aid practices are very centralised to the government in Beijing, 
which coordinates and manages the many facets of its development cooperation. In 
looking at the actors of Chinese development, four agencies have significant role in 
“foreign aid policy and implementation” (Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015, p. 7). 
These are “the State Council, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)” (p. 7). The State Council can 
be identified as “the body that oversees all aid programmes by China”, whereas 
“MOFCOM is the leading agency that coordinates China’s foreign policy, such as 
reviewing requests that come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) that require 
approval, conducting feasibility studies for aid projects, choosing aid implementers and 
conducting project reviews” (p. 7).  
 
 
 - 51 - 
The centralised nature of Chinese development practices between these four agencies do 
not always run in a smooth and harmonious way. MOFCOM officials frequently 
complain about issues, such as the department lacking “the capacity and personnel to 
manage existing aid projects”, and the foreign aid system lacking a “long-term strategy” 
in general (p. 7). To strengthen the coordination among the Chinese government bodies 
in development, China’s 2011 White Paper on Foreign Aid noted that, in 2008, 
MOFCOM, MOFA, and MOF had “established a foreign aid inter-agency liaison 
mechanism, upgraded into an inter-agency coordination mechanism in February 2011” 
(p. 3). However, it is unclear how effective this mechanism has been in fulfilling its task 
of better coordination. 
 
It is not uncommon for the different government bodies dealing with foreign aid to suffer 
from a lack of communication that may stem from unclear divisions of tasks, or 
conflicting agendas: “it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than MOFCOM that 
deals with China’s strategic plan and foreign policies, which has created tensions 
between the two ministries due to overlaps and conflicts in their jurisdiction in this area” 
(p.7). The MOFA’s establishment of a “new Department of International Economy” has 
further blurred “the overlap between the two ministries in terms of responsibility for 
international aid”, in what Constantine, Shankland & Gu (2015) describe as the 
“domestic institutional dilemma” (p. 7-8). This ‘domestic institutional dilemma’ creates 
further problems in the global governance structures of international development, as 
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exemplified by the GPEDC, where there is no clarity as to which Chinese Ministry 
would serve as the interlocutor to be engaged with (p. 8).  
 
4.2 China’s Approach Towards TDC  
While the past few decades have seen China’s development cooperation focused on 
bilateral, state-to-state, cooperation, recent years have seen it increasingly broaden its 
scope towards more multilateral cooperation, predominantly through processes of 
knowledge sharing in cooperation with international organisations, such as the FAO or 
UNDP. However, China has also been increasingly involved in triangular development 
cooperation initiatives with OECD-DAC countries in the developing world. While its 
approach is still very cautious, this section will explore the reasons behind China’s 
cautious stance towards TDC, and other pluralistic forms of cooperation in development. 
Thereon, its motivations for TDC, and concrete examples of its TDC initiatives will be 
given. 
 
4.2.1 Constraints to TDC 
A review of the literature on China and TDC shows that there are two main reasons for 
China’s constrained approach towards TDC (Brant, 2011; Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 
2015; Zhang, 2014; Zhang, 2017). First, the improbability of China adopting similar 
standards of monitoring and evaluation on development impacts as the northern DAC 
donors constrains the possibility of enhanced cooperation in the form of TDC.  Second, 
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as iterated in the literature review on the shortcomings of triangular development 
cooperation, and the difficulties in coming to new norms and values in international 
development aid governance, the lack of trust between China and traditional donors 
limits the possibilities of TDC that involves China and traditional donors. 
 
To tackle the first problem, China needs to be convinced that western donors are willing 
to learn from it, and to acknowledge that their own practices may not be perfect in the 
changing realm of development. Currently, such humility from the West is lacking, and 
it is perhaps a reason why “China is very careful about any form of triangular 
cooperation” (Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015, p. 18). However, the Busan Outcome 
Document, formation of the GPEDC, and new innovative ways of development that are 
being tested by traditional donors (Baker, 2016) suggest that the northern donors are 
seeing the advantages of differentiated development practices that are typical to South-
South cooperation. Therefore, it may only be a question of time before these 
developments are reflected in policy discourse on a higher level, where Chinese partners 
could be convinced that the West is truly acknowledging their positive input on 
development. 
 
The second problem is very much linked to the first one, as mutual trust between China 
and OECD-DAC donors is fundamental for these two representatives of differing 
paradigms in development to understand that their methods and practices can be 
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complementary to one another. As highlighted by Constantine, Shankland & Gu (2015), 
the creation of a relationship that would enhance mutual understanding between the 
North and South would require “a platform of trust, where the Chinese side would feel 
equal to Western academics in the ‘making’ of knowledge” (p. 8). Moreover, this mutual 
trust should be built on a foundation of compromise, where certain political differences 
could be left aside.  
 
Although China is acting more assertively in its development practices, Constantine, 
Shankland and Gu (2015) state that “it does not explicitly want or aim to circumvent 
cooperation with the North” (p. 17). A Chinese scholar seems to affirm this notion by 
saying that “Chinese development cooperation now faces new challenges…as China 
moves from its previous, marginal status to being one of the central powers in the global 
system, it needs to have more multilateral perspectives for its development cooperation 
program, rather than sticking to bilateral channels… China needs to incorporate the 
provision of global public goods into its development cooperation programme, rather 
than primarily focusing on its own economic interests” (p. 17). In this way, as China’s 
engagement in development aid can generally be viewed in the neorealist perspective, 
where it focuses on bilateral cooperation that reaps material gains, it is now seeing that 
its new role as a global superpower may require it to act more constructively in shaping 
new norms and facets of global governance through initiatives, such as triangular 
development cooperation. 
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While multi- and trilateral development cooperation signals a clear change from the 
previous focus on bilateral, demand-driven, development cooperation with its southern 
partners, China remains sceptical about triangular development cooperation, as it sees it 
as a mechanism for western donors to co-opt them into their rigidly based understanding 
of what development aid should entail. Mutual trust must be built, first, through 
communication, and later, through tangible actions. Constantine, Shankland & Gu 
(2015) highlight the “need for improved communication about current DAC thinking 
and the new approaches that DAC members, rising powers and LDCs together are 
developing through the GPEDC” (p. 18).  
 
As an example of building a better relationship between China and traditional donors, a 
proposal of the International Poverty Reduction Centre in China (IPRCC) led to the 
creation of the China-DAC Study Group in 2009, with the aim to “provide an 
international platform for synthesising information and exchanging experiences” (Brant, 
2011, p. 14). The Study Group is focused on two main themes. The first theme focuses 
on “China’s experience of growth and poverty reduction, including the contribution of 
international assistance, and its relevance for other developing countries particularly in 
Africa”, while the second theme focuses on “China’s economic cooperation in Africa 
and its impact on poverty reduction” (p. 15). However, as noted by Brant (2011), one of 
the main limitations of the Study Group is that “it is hosted by the IPRCC rather than the 
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Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which is the key institution with 
policymaking power within the Chinese foreign aid structure” (p. 15).  
 
The political aspect of further development cooperation from the Western side also 
comes into play in the form of a so-called “‘China threat’ narrative among 
policymakers”, where “openness to learning from Chinese-led development at home and 
abroad is compromised by disapproval of the Chinese Communist Party’s stance on 
political freedom and human rights” (Constantine, Shankland & Gu, 2015, p. 18). 
Moreover, the challenge for the northern donors will be to see to what extent is China 
really trying to contribute to building new norms of development cooperation on a 
reciprocal basis, rather than in enhancing its foreign policy initiatives, such as the ‘One 
Road One Belt’ project, or the “Silk Road Fund” (p. 17).  
 
4.2.2 China’s Motivations for TDC 
Constantine, Shankland & Gu (2015) say that China seems to be taking part in triangular 
cooperation “only if recipient countries are clearly playing a leading role in the proposals 
it receives” (p. 18). This falls in line with the idea that TDC should enhance ownership 
of the beneficiary country. Therefore, they find that “the GPEDC could help its DAC 
member countries to engage with China by brokering contacts with third countries, 
especially those within China's near-abroad and its SSC sphere of influence” (p. 18). 
Brant (2011) states that China’s focus in trilateral initiatives seem to be in the sectors of 
 
 - 57 - 
health and agriculture, since these are areas where it has “transferrable expertise”, and it 
can utilise lessons that it learnt from its own developmental experiences (p. 15). 
 
On the other hand, Zhang (2014) shows that the number of trilateral projects China is 
involved with has seen a steady increase over the past 10 years (Zhang, 2014). China 
has signed memorandums of understanding and made pledges to increase trilateral 
cooperation with the US, the UK, the UNDP, FAO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand 
in a range of sectors and regions, from the Pacific to Africa (Zhang, 2014; Zhang, 2017).  
Zhang (2014) lists three main motivations for China to participate in triangular 
development cooperation. First, TDC can promote “mutual understanding and learning” 
between aid actors of the North and China, which in hand may “lead to changes in the 
mindset of Chinese aid officials and scholars” (p. 2). Second, Zhang finds that “some 
Chinese aid actors may push for trilateral aid cooperation”, due to the “diversity and 
divergence of interests” among them, where some could support TDC as a way “to learn 
from traditional donors and improve their practices” (p. 2). Third, TDC can be regarded 
as a way for China to enhance its “global image as a constructive and responsible 
partner” (p. 2). 
 
Zhang’s (2017) very recent study on Chinese motivations for trilateral cooperation 
asserts that China has moved from its focus on bilateral aid to “increasingly conducting 
trilateral cooperation with western donors and UN agencies” (p. 1). His study argues that 
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China is emphasising “its identity as a growing great power in the development sector 
using trilateral cooperation to build its global image” (p. 1), which further supports the 
third motivation listed above. 
 
These studies affirm that China is diversifying its aid modalities from a sole focus on 
bilateral cooperation. However, as triangular development cooperation still represents a 
very small proportion of China’s development cooperation portfolio, the increased 
participation in TDC just seems to follow the general trend of China increasing its 
development aid cooperation activities in general. However, Zhang (2017) asserts that 
while triangular development cooperation of China is still in its early stages, and rather 
“small in scale and technically focused”, more opportunities exist for TDC to occur 
between China and traditional donors (p. 14). Such increased participation in TDC may 
foster new modalities in international development cooperation and its global 
governance in the future. Hereon, case studies of Chinese involvement in TDC will be 
explored. 
 
4.3 Case Studies of China in TDC 
While there is a lack of a comprehensive and in-depth case studies on the modalities of 
Chinese involvement in triangular development cooperation, this part of the chapter 
offers insights from the limited scholarly work that can be found on TDC projects that 
China has been involved in. Here, gratitude should be afforded to Denghua Zhang, 
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whose fieldwork on triangular development cooperation initiatives offer perhaps the 
most in-depth observations on TDC that involves China.  
 
Looking at triangular development cooperation initiatives, which include a OECD-DAC 
country, international organisation or multilateral development agency in the role of 
provider, with China as a pivotal country, the OECD’s 2013 literature review on TDC 
finds that China has taken part in TDC projects across sectors. However, in-depth 
information regarding these projects is lacking. 
 
In short, China has partnered with the US on a TDC project in education in Liberia; with 
Japan on TDC projects in environmental protection in ASEAN countries; with the UK 
on TDC projects in environmental protection in both Bangladesh and Nepal; with 
Australia on a TDC project in healthcare in Papua New Guinea; with New Zealand on a 
TDC project in water sanitation in the Cook Islands; with the World Bank on unspecified 
knowledge-sharing TDC projects with African countries (OECD, 2013); with the UK on 
TDC projects in agriculture in Malawi and Uganda; and with the US on TDC projects in 
agriculture in Timor Leste (Zhang, 2017, p. 4). China has also worked on trilateral 
development cooperation with the UNDP in Africa in “agriculture (Cambodia), 
renewable energies (Ghana, Zambia, Burundi), and disaster management (Nepal, 
Bangladesh, Malawi)” (UNDP, 2017). Furthermore, it conducts TDC projects with the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the UN. 
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It must be noted that China has also engaged in TDC projects with other so-called pivotal 
countries, like Brazil and India. However, as this paper focuses on TDC as a facet of 
cooperation between so-called traditional donors or international organisations, 
emerging donors, and beneficiaries, these projects are not included in this study. 
 
Hereon, a few cases that had more in-detail data available will be introduced, with the 
aim of extracting some of the main modalities of TDC projects that China is involved 
in. 
 
4.3.1 China, Australia and Papua New Guinea 
China signed its Memorandum of Understanding in Development Cooperation with 
Australia in April of 2013, as the countries agreed “to promote practical partnerships 
concerning development issues throughout the Asia-Pacific region” (Vaccines News 
Reports, 2015). Typical to China's developmental regime, its cooperation is based on the 
state-to-state agreement with Australia, where pragmatism is highlighted. As Australia 
represents a traditional OECD-DAC donor, whose level of aid is at similar levels of 
China, it makes for an interesting case study of TDC with three governments, where 
China is the pivotal country, and Papua New Guinea the beneficiary country. 
 
As Australia and China represent some of the largest donors of aid to Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), “the PNG government...requested China and Australia to help combat malaria” 
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(Zhang, 2015a, p. 1). According to Vaccine News Reports (2015), “approximately 95 
percent of the people living in Papua New Guinea are in areas that are considered at high 
risk of contracting malaria”. Furthermore, “malaria is a significant health as well as 
economic burden, and it has negatively affected Papua New Guinea and its 
development”. In this way, the project is geared towards alleviating a very concise 
developmental concern. 
 
The main objectives of the project are twofold: “to strengthen PNG's health system by 
improving PNG Central Public Health Laboratory (CPHL) services and malaria 
diagnosis, and to strengthen PNG malaria operational research by assisting the PNG 
Institute of Medical Research (IMR)” (Zhang, 2015a, p. 1). For the period of 2016 – 
2018, Australia has pledged to “provide AUD4 million in project funding 
and…strengthening of capacity-building” in “medical institutions to correctly diagnose 
and treat malaria”, while China pledged to offer “technical expertise” and to “facilitate 
project planning” (APLMA, 2016).  
 
Australia is motivated to pursue triangular development cooperation with China, due to 
it allowing it “to influence China’s aid delivery” and to “utilise China’s expertise and 
successful experience in eradicating malaria within its own borders” (Zhang, 2015a, p. 
1). China is motivated by the opportunity for its “scientists to carry out applied research”, 
and “Australia's broad knowledge of PNG harnessed over many decades” (p. 1-2). 
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Lastly, as “malaria control is a top priority of the PNG government”, TDC in harnessing 
such control allows for the reduction of “aid duplication”, where two countries are 
engaged in similar projects in parallel, and could possibly “relieve the burden on PNG’s 
limited institutional capacity” (p. 2). According to research, “many PNG officials 
stressed that they were keen to guide donors to provide aid to areas of their comparative 
advantages so as to promote better results and increase aid efficiency” (p. 2). 
 
This case provides a textbook example of triangular development cooperation, where 
Australia, the traditional donor, is providing finance, and seeking to engage emerging 
donors (China) in development cooperation with the motivation to influence its 
development practices, and foster new norms of development cooperation. Furthermore, 
it sees China, the pivotal country, share its own developmental experience of malaria 
control, as its practices of South-South cooperation may allow it to effectively foster 
positive developmental outcomes in the beneficiary country. Lastly, the beneficiary 
country, Papua New Guinea, benefits from the comparative advantages that China and 
Australia offer in the form of knowledge sharing (to enhance malaria control) and 
financial support. 
 
In Zhang’s (2014) list of motivations of China towards TDC, this case seems to promote 
both its motivation for mutual understanding and learning, and to enhance its global 
image as a partner with advanced countries, like Australia. 
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4.3.2 China, US, and Timor-Leste 
During “the fourth meeting of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing 
in May 2012”, the US and China agreed to pursue development cooperation “in 
agriculture, health and human resources in other countries” (Zhang, 2015b, p. 1). A 
memorandum of understanding was signed between the two countries in October 2013, 
as they agreed to pursue triangular development cooperation “on agricultural 
development and food security in Timor Leste” (Zhang, 2015b, p. 1). Cooperation 
between these two partners is particularly interesting, as they are two of the biggest 
economic and military powers on the world stage today, whose relations and views on 
many world issues are often starkly different.  
 
This project that ran for just over a year from November 2013 until December 2014 is 
described by Zhang (2015b) as a “small pilot project”, where agricultural experts from 
both the US and China “taught Timorese farmers the knowledge and skills to increase 
production of selected crops” (p. 1). The partnership is said to “contribute to the 
sustainable development of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) by demonstrating 
opportunities for increasing farmer incomes while improving natural resource 
management through cultivation of cash and staple crops” (aiddata, 2013). Instead of 
“providing direct financial support to the Timor-Leste government”, this project saw 
both the US and China cover the costs of training (p. 1). The Timor-Leste government 
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provided the training facilities and demonstration plot where the activities took place (p. 
1).  
Similar to Australia in the aforementioned case study, the motivations for the US in 
taking part in this TDC project are reported as its “deep interest in engaging China on 
global development” (p. 1). Furthermore, further engagement in “improving the 
agricultural capacity and performance” has been “a longstanding priority of USAID in 
Timor-Leste” (p. 1). As “China has expertise in small-scale agricultural farming and 
recent experience in eradicating extreme rural poverty, cooperating with China provided 
an excellent opportunity for USAID to learn from China” (p. 1). Additionally, the 
diplomatic factor is evident, as these two major powers seek new facets of cooperation 
and engagement with one another.  
 
Zhang (2015b) acknowledges the fundamental importance of the US-China relationship 
as a core factor for China to take part in such a project with the US. In a similar way as 
the US, China wants to explore new ways of cooperating with the US across different 
sectors.  
 
Lastly, as agriculture remains “the main source of livelihood for Timorese people”, it 
benefits from “learning from the agricultural expertise from both countries” (p. 2). 
Furthermore, as food security and a lack of capacity are serious issues in Timor-Leste, 
and there are “over 40 donors working in Timor-Leste, aid coordination is an ongoing 
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challenge” (p. 2). For this reason, Zhang (2015b) states that “this pilot trilateral project 
is embraced by the Timor-Leste government as a way to strengthen aid ownership and 
reduce duplication” (p. 2). 
 
While the political motivations of any US-China cooperation seem evident, this project 
is also an interesting example of TDC in that it has no division of provider and pivotal 
country. Both the US and China act as providers and pivotal countries at the same time. 
In a way, they pooled their expertise in agriculture to diversify Timorian farmers’ 
knowledge of farming practices. In this way, China and the US were at an equal footing, 
both doing their jobs with their own resources, as neither power exerted more influence 
on the other in any area of activities. The project allowed for the development actors 
from all three countries to learn from one another, and “to coordinate with each other in 
this new type of aid delivery” (Zhang, 2015b, p. 2). The agricultural knowledge transfer 
was said to be evident as “Timorian agricultural officials and students” gave very 
positive feedback on the project (p. 2). 
 
China has been involved in setting up similar agricultural demonstration centres, 
particularly in Africa, in countries like Mozambique. However, this seems to be the only 
case of such centres being set up in a triangular setting. In Zhang’s (2014) definition of 
motivations of China towards TDC, this case also seems to promote both its motivation 
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for mutual understanding and learning, and to enhance its global image as a partner with 
advanced countries, like the US.  
 
4.3.3 China and the UNDP  
As mentioned earlier on, China has been active in TDC projects with the UNDP. While 
its approach and scope of cooperation seems to be widening, in the past, China seemed 
to have preferred triangular development cooperation with UN agencies, such as the 
UNDP or FAO, as they provide it with the opportunity to play a more active role in less 
competitive and confrontational settings.  
 
An online publication on the UNDP-China Partnership on South-South and Global 
Cooperation shows that there has been a vast amount of Chinese universities, interest 
groups, private sector actors, and non-governmental agencies involved in this 
cooperation, in addition to the typical sub-agencies of its relevant ministries that usually 
manage its development cooperation (UNDP, 2015). These include organisations like 
Action Aid (China), Environmist Ltd. (China), Shanghai Institute for International 
Studies, China Carbon Forum and Peking University (UNDP, 2015). The involvement 
of more aid actors in China may be linked to the second level of China’s motivations for 
TDC as portrayed by Zhang (2014), where he notes that they may support TDC in the 
hope of it pushing the Chinese development aid regime towards a certain direction. 
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The involvement of more actors starkly differs from the perception that Chinese 
development cooperation is very centralised to MOFCOM, MFA and MOFA. This may 
be a result of China being more flexible in allowing a larger pool of its development 
actors to take part in projects that are made in cooperation with international 
organisations, rather than country-partners. However, the depth of the role of these non-
governmental partners are not expanded upon in the UNDP (2015) report, as they may 
have only played minimal parts. In general, the Chinese ministries involved in 
development often tasks its state-owned enterprises, state-backed financial institutions, 
and other state-loyal agencies to enact its developmental projects.  
 
Hereon, the China-UNDP TDC projects in renewable energy in both Zambia and Ghana 
are described in further detail. What makes these two projects interesting is that, while 
China plays the pivotal partner in both projects, the UNDP acts as the provider, through 
funding that is provided by Denmark, a traditional OECD-DAC donor. However, the 
financing part seems to be the entirety of Denmark’s role in these two projects. 
4.3.3.1 China-UNDP in Zambia and Ghana 
Both the China-Ghana-UNDP Trilateral Cooperation on Renewable Energy and China-
Zambia-UNDP Trilateral Cooperation on Renewable Energy projects concentrate on the 
transfer of renewable energy technologies and capacity building in these countries. Both 
countries suffer from a lack of electrification, especially in rural areas, where only 40% 
in Ghana, and a mere 3% in Zambia, have access to electricity (UNDP, 2017b; UNDP, 
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2017c). While access to electricity is slightly better in Ghana than Zambia, its population 
is excessively dependant on wood fuel, which has a negative health impact (2017b). 
Therefore, it is essential that Ghanaian development ensures its people has access to 
systems providing healthier, renewable energy. As “Zambia has the second largest 
potential for solar power in the world... and an abundance of rivers and water resources 
in rural areas...solar- and hydro power are identified as the most appropriate renewable 
energy technologies for Zambia” (UNDP, 2017b).  
 
China acts as the pivotal country in both cases, as its own experience and technical 
knowhow in the renewable energy sector allow for it to share its knowledge by means 
of South-South cooperation (UNDP, 2017b). Furthermore, the projects offer China the 
opportunity “to build project management capabilities” and enhance its “approach to 
south-south cooperation” (UNDP, 2017b). As “Ghana and Zambia both have a gap in 
electrification of especially rural areas”, both “countries have unique insight into local 
context, including productive uses of energy and experience with past electrification 
projects that can be shared” with their counterparts (UNDP, 2017b). Finally, the “UNDP 
plays a facilitating, coordinating and oversight role between and for the implementing 
agencies and contributes with its project management and learning process tools” 
UNDP, 2017b).  
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Both projects are financed by Denmark, with the project in Ghana receiving USD 
2,720,000 in funding (UNDP, 2017b) and the project in Zambia receiving 
USD2,624,400 in funding (UNDP, 2017c). In this way, the UNDP and Denmark play 
the role of the provider, or traditional donor, who provides financing and the capacity to 
oversee the project. While both projects started in 2014, they are expected to be finished 
in 2018. 
 
These projects are regarded as ‘pilot projects’, or ‘showcase projects’, where each 
partner can contribute and learn from one another in a trilateral setting. In this way, the 
projects entail a learning experience, while they are also expected to serve as outlines 
for further cooperation between these partners in other projects, and as models for TDC 
in other regions of Africa. These cases differ from the earlier cases in that they include 
the UNDP, rather than a specific country, as the main provider or ‘overseer’. 
Furthermore, they see China as the provider of the technical knowledge, as its role as a 
provider of South-South cooperation is highlighted. Such cooperation may serve as a 
platform for larger TDC projects with international organisations in the future. 
 
Like the China-US-Timor-Leste project and China-Australia-PNG project, in Zhang’s 
(2014) list of Chinese motivations for TDC, these projects seem to be motivated by both 
mutual understanding and learning, and efforts to enhance China's global image. 
 
 
 - 70 - 
5. Brazil in Triangular Development Cooperation 
 
Brazil’s development cooperation has a long history, and like China, it has visibly 
increased its development aid in terms of its geographic reach, and sectors that it 
provides aid to. Moreover, this is increasingly being done in a variety of forms, from 
bilateral and trilateral to multilateral partnerships. In fact, the OECD (2016) showed that 
the year 2010 already saw 60% of Brazil’s development aid being “channelled through 
multilateral organisations”. Thus, Brazil’s practices of South-South cooperation are 
much more diversified than those of China, which still focuses mainly on bilateral forms 
of development cooperation. However, Brazil reflects similar aspects of Chinese aid in 
that its model of South-South cooperation is still evolving, as it has been finding its 
characteristic modalities in recent years. The actors and modalities involved in Brazilian 
development cooperation, and its approach towards, and motivations for, triangular 
development cooperation are further elaborated on in this chapter. 
 
5.1 Background on Brazil’s Development Practices 
Brazil has been providing development aid under the auspices of South-South 
Cooperation for more than 40 years, while the new millennia saw a significant increase 
in its development cooperation efforts, as the “number of technical cooperation projects 
initiated by Brazil” increased from a mere 23 in 2003 to 413 in 2009 (ODI, 2010). Da 
Silva (2016) echoes this in saying that while Brazil’s development cooperation started 
in the 1960s, and was based on a pragmatic approach linked to its foreign policy, where 
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it sought to advance “national development through export promotion”, it was only in 
the mid-1990s, and most notably, during the presidency of Lula da Silva, from 2002 to 
2013, that South-South Cooperation saw “an expressive expansion of resources, 
recipients and projects” (p. 23). From the 1970s onwards, Brazil has branded its 
development regime “under the heading of horizontal or South-South cooperation” 
(Schläger, 2007, p.5). Nevertheless, Brazil regards its position as a donor “as hybrid in 
nature”, as it is both an industrialized and developing country, “where modernity and 
backwardness live side by side” (p. 5).  
 
Like other emerging donors, Brazil's approach to development is largely based on its 
own development experience. As a typical representative of South-South cooperation, 
Brazil’s official development discourse highlights horizontality, solidarity, non-
conditionality, a demand-driven approach, respect for sovereignty, and sharing its own 
“successful public policy experiences” (Da Silva, 2016, p. 23).  
 
However, Farias (2015) asserts that Brazil’s aid is unique from other providers of South-
South cooperation, such as China, as it is based on untied cooperation. She asserts that 
in “being an emerging “donor,” Brazil is now globally perceived as a legitimate and 
innovative voice for development as it has been able to draw on concrete achievements 
to justify and legitimate leadership in international development, and not just rely on 
rhetoric or ideological commonalities” (p. 7).  
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Schläger (2007) also describes how, as opposed to China and India, Brazil’s 
development activities seem to be much less focused on its own political and economic 
interests, as it “works consistently as an advocate and initiator of South-South 
cooperation in the interest of the global South” (p. 3). She highlights how its experience 
of engagement in “innovative multilateral and trilateral forms of cooperation”, and 
expertise across many sectors, would allow Brazil to “serve as a model for other 
emerging donors” (p. 3).  
 
Brazil has criticized the industrialised countries for often enacting selective development 
policies, where the ownership of development goals, and benefits to recipient countries, 
are overlooked, as the participation of these recipient countries in authoring the 
programmes is often lacking (Schläger, 2007, p. 5). Nevertheless, in echoing China’s 
approach, Brazil does not seek to undermine North-South cooperation, but 
acknowledges that South-South cooperation “requires a different set of rules,” (Farani, 
2011 as cited in da Silva, 2016) and that Brazil could act as a bridge between traditional 
donors from developed countries, and the developing world (Schläger, 2007; Abdenur, 
2007; Chaturvedi, 2012; Farias, 2015; da Silva, 2016).  
 
Seifert & de Renzio (2014) note that “Brazil stands out as a provider of South-South 
cooperation that has increased its engagement in technical cooperation significantly 
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during the past decade” (p. 11). They note that Brazil is a unique emerging donor, as it 
has “maintained a certain distance from OECD/DAC positions”, whilst it has 
simultaneously “engaged in a number of Triangular Cooperation projects with Northern 
donors such as Japan and Germany” (p. 11). Brazil has gained recognition in the 
international community for its “underscored commitment to multilateralism”, where 
“important industrialised countries” recognize it as a partner for cooperation, and less 
developed countries recognize “its role as an advocate of the global South” (Schläger, 
2007, p. 3).  
 
Some scholars do link the increase in Brazilian development cooperation to its foreign 
policy and economic interests. They claim that as Brazil’s diplomatic presence has been 
increased on a worldwide scale, the country seeks to garner support from developing 
countries for its international ambitions, which include its aspiration to gain a 
“permanent seat on the UN Security Council” (ODI, 2010, p. 2; Schläger, 2007, p. 8). 
Echoing its diplomatic ambitions being linked to its development practices, a study of 
Farias (2014) quoted a Canadian diplomat referring to Brazil’s motivations for TDC 
being based on seeking diplomatic gains, rather than commercial gains. In this way, 
Brazil’s development cooperation seems to be geared towards building an image of itself 
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Schläger (2007) asserts that “many members of the international community accept 
Brazil as a “like-minded ally”, and therefore accord to it a central role on the stage of 
world politics” (p. 3). In an increasingly multipolar world, Brazil is being considered as 
one of the main pillars, or go-to countries, in both South American and global affairs. 
Schläger (2007) also notes that Brazil is exercising “its role as a rising power by 
engaging in consistent efforts to expand and strategically anchor South-South 
cooperation, and in doing so, it has proven to be a constructive actor in shaping the 
architecture of global governance” (p. 3). This assertion fits neatly in with the second 
hypothesis of this thesis, which is that Brazil’s engagement in triangular development 
cooperation is linked with its desire to influence and shape the institutions and 
organization of global governance in development. This issue will be analysed more 
thoroughly in Chapter 6.  
 
Nevertheless, while Brazil is regarded as a leader of South-South cooperation, and a 
partner for international cooperation in general, it still has a wide variety of domestic 
developmental challenges to overcome. Issues related to high crime rates, and poverty 
in the suburbs of its largest cities have received heightened international media coverage 
in recent years, linked to the major international sporting events, such as the FIFA World 
Cup 2014 and Rio Olympics 2016, which were held in Brazil.  
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5.1.1 Modalities of Brazilian Aid 
Brazil aims at building its own distinct model of development cooperation, where it 
“distances itself from e.g. Chinese modes of cooperation, and rather follows a way 
between the Western and the Asian ‘realpolitik model’, drawing on both and combining 
this with specific Brazilian experiences” (Piefer, 2014, p. 10). 
Brazil’s development practices can be grouped into two distinct modes of cooperation: 
technical cooperation and financial cooperation. Its technical cooperation, which 
includes “the transfer of knowledge, technologies and skills to promote development”, 
is focused on “support for agriculture, health and education” (ODI, 2010, p. 2). This is 
the main facet of Brazilian development cooperation, particularly in Brazil’s approach 
to triangular development cooperation.  
 
Its modalities of financial cooperation practices are far more difficult to define, as 
Schläger (2007) notes that there is a lack of documentation on “the conception, 
guidelines, structure, and volume” of its financial cooperation. She notes that the 
financial cooperation seems “to be coordinated mainly be a small subdivision of the 
finance ministry that is also responsible for developing export credit lines and transacting 
bi- and multilateral debt relief” (p. 7). As Brazil’s contributions to TDC are made in the 
format of technical cooperation, where the traditional donors usually contribute to TDC 
financially, this paper focuses on its technical cooperation, and not look at the financial 
cooperation aspect of Brazil’s development regime.  
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Like China, Brazil does not release data on its development aid, or follow any similar 
criteria as OECD-DAC countries in reporting its aid budget. Because of this weakness 
in monitoring and evaluation of aid projects, there is a lack of data to review the impact 
of Brazil’s development projects in beneficiary countries (ODI, 2010, p. 3). Linked to 
its desire to remain a distinct model of development aid, Brazil does not want to be 
constrained by the guidelines developed by traditional donors, and “has expressed its 
desire to distance itself from a process it sees as dominated by a ‘rigid view’ of the 
international development system and that reproduces models and practices of 
traditional donors” (p. 3). 
 
The ODI (2010) lists five features that make “Brazilian development cooperation... 
particularly appealing to developing countries” (p. 2): First, its experiences in policy-
making can be regarded as relevant for other developing countries. “Second, the 
technology and expertise offered by Brazil is a good match for the level of economic 
and institutional development and the climatic conditions of developing countries. Third, 
Brazil benefits from a political neutrality derived from its lack of a dominant colonial 
past. Fourth, the absence of aid conditionality. And finally, Brazil is both a recipient and 
a provider of aid which, arguably, gives it a better understanding of the needs and 
constraints facing developing countries as aid recipients” (p. 2). 
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These features are not exclusive to Brazil, as there are both emerging donors and 
traditional donors with similar features in their development practices. However, as a 
combined package, these features “give Brazil some comparative advantages in the aid 
scene, as suggested by the increasing demand for Brazilian cooperation from developing 
countries” (ODI, 2010, p. 2). Moreover, Brazil is regarded as “a key partner of the 
OECD”, which gives it a lot of influence in bringing attention to South-South 
cooperation in the development arena (OECD, 2016). 
 
As asserted earlier, Brazil sees development as a core facet of its foreign policy. 
However, the link between its foreign policy and development practices, which are based 
on South-South cooperation, are focused on garnering diplomatic gains in international 
forums, rather than any material gains: “Brazil has stated its commitment not to orient 
the development aid it provides to its own national financial and/or material interests” 
(Schläger, 2007, p. 5). Moreover, ex-Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, stated that 
Brazilian technical cooperation funds are not in any way linked to its “national 
commercial interests nor on conditionalities for recipient countries” (p. 6).  
 
In its foreign policy, Brazil does distinguish “between South-South cooperation, 
development cooperation, technical and financial cooperation, and trade and 
investment” (Schläger, 2007, p. 5). It regards its “development policy as a contribution 
to international security and peace policy” (p. 5). In this way, its development policy is 
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strongly linked to its foreign policy, where it is reputed for its “commitment to 
multilateralism, non-interference, and the peaceful resolution of conflict” (p. 5).  
 
The link between Brazil’s development policy both home and abroad is well summarised 
in a statement by ex-President Lula da Silva: “the government’s fight against poverty 
and unequal income distribution at home and its assertive and activist foreign policy can 
be viewed as two sides of the same coin” (Soares & Hirst, 2006, p.21, as cited in 
Schläger, 2007, p. 5). Nevertheless, Brazilian technical cooperation has been linked to 
certain political guidelines.  
 
These include the “prioritization of technical cooperation programs that help to intensify 
relations between Brazil and partner countries (countries of paramount priority for 
Brazil’s foreign policy); support for projects in line with national programs and priorities 
of recipient countries; priority for projects that entail multiplier effects and hold promise 
of sustainability after project completion; priority for projects that promise the greatest 
success and avoid pulverizing waste of funds; preference for projects in which recipient 
countries participate by mobilizing funds of their own” (Schläger, 2007, p. 6). 
 
As South-South cooperation is the main instrument of Brazil’s foreign policy, it has 
“cooperation agreements with 53 bilateral partners” (p. 5). While Brazil’s development 
cooperation used to be focused on countries with whom it shared cultural or linguistic 
 
 - 79 - 
affinities, such as those in South America, or Lusophone countries, like Angola, East 
Timor, and Guinea-Bissau, today its cooperation extends to all parts of the developing 
world (Schläger, 2007; ODI, 2010; Chaturvedi, 2015).  
5.1.2 Actors in Brazil’s Development Regime 
The main actor in overseeing Brazil’s development cooperation is the President, who 
largely formulates what the country’s development cooperation regime will entail during 
different presidencies (Piefer, 2010; Chichava & Durán, 2016). In addition to the 
President, the main actor in development is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), while 
the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (abbreviated as 
ABC), was founded in 1987 as an autonomous working unit of the MFA to provide and 
manage technical cooperation (OECD, 2016; ODI, 2010; Schläger, 2007; Abdenur, 
2007).  
 
Piefer (2014) describes Brazilian development cooperation as being “characterized by a 
strong institutional fragmentation and a plurality of actors, which is due to the fact that 
there is neither a legal basis for development cooperation, nor a budget allocated to aid 
activities” (p. 10) While the growth of Brazil’s aid regime has been impressive, it has 
put a lot of strain on its institutions that work in development cooperation: “their 
activities are...constrained by the existing institutional framework as well as capacity 
weaknesses” (ODI, 2010, p. 2).  
 
 
 - 80 - 
Unlike China, Brazil’s aid regime is very diversified, as a lot of different actors, from 
public research institutions and NGOs to private institutions and government Ministries 
take an active role in its development initiatives. The ABC is generally responsible for 
the coordination and “political steering” of Brazilian development cooperation, while 
“ministries, government agencies or other specialized institutions are implementing 
partners” (Piefer, 2010, p. 10). While the diversity of actors can hold positive aspects for 
differentiated methods of aid stemming from Brazil, scholars have criticised the 
cooperation amongst Brazilian development actors as being fragmented (ODI, 2010; 
Piefier, 2016). 
 
The functioning of the ABC has received the most criticism. While it is supposed to be 
an autonomous working unit, the autonomy of ABC is questioned by the ODI (2010), 
who say that it has struggle to fulfil its functions “effectively, not least because of its 
limited autonomy” (p. 2). As a department of the Foreign Ministry, the ABC does not 
manage its own human resources. Therefore, its “frail institutional environment is 
marked by high staff turnover”, where “career diplomats…rotate posts regularly, while 
the remaining staff is “composed of short-term UNDP consultants” (da Silva, 2016). 
Piefer (2014) adds that the “ABC does not have genuine development cooperation staff”, 
as “technical experts are usually “borrowed” from other line ministries” (p. 10). 
Furthermore, the ABC is subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and therefore, 
lacks its own budget (ODI, 2010; da Silva, 2016).  
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These characteristics have “limited the Agency’s ability to develop a cooperation policy, 
provide effective coordination or be strategic and efficient in deploying human and 
financial resources” (ODI, 2010, p. 2). Moreover, Brazil's development regime also 
suffers from “important technical deficiencies”, including a “chronic lack of monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) across all cooperation programmes” (p. 2). These shortcomings 
have resulted in lacking, or poor, reporting on Brazilian experiences in development 
cooperation, which is essential for it to “generate best practice guidelines” (p. 3).   
 
5.2 Brazil’s Approach to TDC 
Brazil’s proactivity in promoting and providing triangular development cooperation has 
been noted by several scholars and institutions (Schläger, 2007; Abdenur, 2007; Farias, 
2014; ODI, 2010; OECD, 2016; Piefer, 2014; Chaturvedi, 2015). By 2010, the ABC was 
involved in 88 triangular development projects in 27 countries, with both bilateral and 
multilateral partners, such as Japan and the International Labour Organisation, as TDC 
projects represented a fifth of Brazil’s technical cooperation portfolio (ODI, 2010, p. 3). 
Like other emerging donors, the government of Brazil remains sceptical about TDC, as 
it fears that it may dilute “its policy independence and…political benefits” (ODI, 2010, 
p. 3). Nevertheless, it has been active in initiating “trilateral agreements with all bilateral 
agencies represented in Brasília” (p. 3).  A study by Farias (2014), related to triangular 
development cooperation between Brazil and Canada as co-donors, found that Brazil 
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was not willing to budge on its strong stance against tied aid practices and 
conditionalities. In this way, Brazil defends its practices of development cooperation, 
and is very wary of northern donors trying to influence it.  
Chaturvadi’s (2015) largescale study on TDC projects worldwide found that Brazil and 
Chile were the leading pivotal countries in providing and promoting TDC. Brazil’s TDC 
projects have focused on areas such as agriculture, education, food security, health, and 
capacity building in public administration, mainly in Africa and Latin America, where 
its main partner-countries have been Japan, Germany, and the USA, while it has also 
cooperated actively with international organisations, such as the UNDP, FAO, 
UNESCO, ILO and UNESCO (OECD, 2016; Chaturvedi, 2015; Abdenur, 2007).  
 
5.2.1 Motivations  
Brazil is motivated by TDC, as it regards such multilateral initiatives as conferring its 
technical cooperation model legitimacy (ODI, 2010), and allows it to influence and 
shape the new facets of global governance in development aid. In this way, Brazil’s 
approach to TDC seems to be based on its hope to promote South-South cooperation, 
enhance its diplomatic gains, and gain recognition in the international arena. Moreover, 
cooperation with traditional donors allows Brazil to expand its development assistance 
portfolio, and gives it access to “cutting-edge technologies and expertise on areas where 
Brazil lags behind” (ODI, 2010, p. 3). However, it is important to note that while this 
thesis focuses on Brazilian TDC with northern donors, or international organisations, 
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and beneficiaries, Brazil is also very active in TDC with other emerging donors from the 
South. 
In a study on the approach of Brazil to TDC, Abdenur (2007) quotes a statement by the 
ABC’s South-South Cooperation Division that highlights the prioritisation of “technical 
cooperation programs that strengthen Brazil’s relations with its partners in development, 
especially with those countries that are priorities for Brazil’s foreign policy” (ABC, 
2007a as cited in Abdenur, 2007, p. 7). In this way, Abdenur (2007) asserts that the 
government of Brazil “explicitly acknowledges that participation in triangular 
cooperation is not only a goal unto itself but also serves the broader purpose of furthering 
international relations” (p. 7). In an overview of ABC’s website and statements, Abdenur 
(2007) found that the “Brazilian government uses technical cooperation to further a 
number of broader foreign policy goals” (p. 8). Abdenur’s (2007) analysis of ABC’s 
charters and other documents in relation to Brazil’s approach to triangular development 
cooperation “reveal a multitude of frequently overlapping justifications for participation 
in triangular cooperation” (p. 12). 
 
First, Brazil engages in “South-South technical cooperation” and TDC for reasons of 
pragmatism. It sees TDC as a way for it to share its knowledge, and influence other 
countries (p. 8). Second, it engages in such cooperation for altruistic reasons, where it 
“posits itself as an altruistic lender of knowledge and experience” (p. 8). In this way, its 
development cooperation is linked to building a positive image of itself, in a similar way 
 
 - 84 - 
as China. Third, it considers South-South cooperation as a tool to strengthen its cultural 
ties with fellow developing countries. This is evident in the way it has focused a large 
amount of its aid towards South America, or Lusophone countries further away. Fourth, 
Brazil engages in TDC to strengthen its role as a regional leader: “Brazil also uses South-
South transfer, including triangular cooperation, to further its goal of consolidating a 
position of regional leadership in Latin America and the Caribbean” (p. 10).  Lastly, 
Brazil uses TDC and South-South cooperation to “forge and strengthen ties with leaders 
of other regions – the so-called pivotal countries” (p. 11). 
 
5.3 Case Studies of Brazil in TDC 
Contrary to the case of China, there is quite a large body of literature that includes data 
and case studies of Brazilian involvement in triangular development cooperation. This 
seems to confirm that Brazil has been the most active pivotal country in taking part in 
triangular development cooperation initiatives. As pointed out earlier on, the year 2010 
already saw Brazil taking part in 88 different TDC projects, while the OECD’s 2013 
literature review on triangular development cooperation shows that Brazil is clearly the 
most present and active pivotal partner in TDC (OECD, 2013).  
 
Brazil is involved in TDC projects with a variety of OECD-DAC countries, such as 
Japan, Germany, US, UK, Canada, and Spain and international organisations, such as 
the UNDP, FAO, and ILO, across sectors, which include agriculture, energy generation 
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and supply, fishing, forestry, environmental protection, government and civil society, 
health, other social infrastructure and services, population policies / programmes and 
reproductive health, and water and sanitation (OECD, 2013).  
 
A UNDP report (2016), which based its data on the Brazilian ABC’s database, shows 
that Brazil was involved in 50 TDC projects in agriculture, 29 in health, 23 in public 
administration, 23 in environment, 20 in jobs and employment, 15 in public security, 13 
in social development, 13 in education, 11 in cities, five in non-identified areas, four in 
fishing, three in science and technology, two in planning, two in mines and energy, two 
in culture, one in transport, one in livestock, one in justice, one in industry and trade, 
and one in communication (p. 11).  
 
Moreover, Brazil has partnered with other emerging donors, like India, China or South 
Africa, in triangular development cooperation, where traditional donors are not included. 
However, as this thesis looks at triangular development cooperation as a bridge between 
traditional donors, or international organisations, and emerging donors, and explores the 
different stances that Brazil and China take towards this sort of cooperation, it does not 
consider triangular cooperation that is entirely based on South-South cooperation.  
 
As there is a vast amount of case studies on Brazilian triangular development 
cooperation, this section aims to portray the breadth of TDC projects that Brazil is 
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involved in, by introducing five different kinds of case studies. As Brazil’s approach to 
TDC seems to be based on its hope to promote South-South cooperation, enhance its 
diplomatic gains, and gain recognition in the international arena, this section will 
introduce facets of Brazilian TDC that fulfil these logics in partnership with both 
traditional donors, and international organisations, in a range of sectors.  
 
It will look at the controversial ProSAVANA TDC project between Japan, Brazil and 
Mozambique in agriculture in Mozambique; a TDC project between Brazil, Germany 
and Mozambique in disaster prevention in Mozambique; a multi-partner TDC project 
between Brazil, Canada, Norway, international organisations and Haiti in security; and 
a TDC project between Brazil, the UNDP and the World Bank, and several partner 
countries, in poverty reduction.  
 
The multi-partner case studies will portray the more pluralistic settings of Brazilian 
TDC, where its role as a pivotal actor is enacted by Brazilian NGOs, while the Brazilian 
governmental actors only plays a supportive, and minimal role. This is rather contrary 
to China, who maintains a strong diplomatic presence in its TDC projects, where at least 
its local embassies will regularly oversee how Chinese actors are performing.  
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5.3.1 Brazil, Japan and Mozambique 
The PROSAVANA project between Brazil, Japan and Mozambique is based on the 
experience of the PRODECER bilateral project (1979-2001) between Japan and Brazil, 
which transformed Brazil’s tropical savannah (cerrado) “into one of the world’s most 
agriculturally productive regions” (Chichava & Durán, 2016, p. 2). In replicating the 
success of the PRODECER project, this project is meant to transform Mozambique’s 
Nacala Corridor into highly productive agricultural terrain that would address the 
country’s food security issues by producing excess supply to increase exports of 
agricultural goods (Chichava & Durán, 2016; Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016; Amanor 
& Chichava, 2016). The project began in 2011, and is expected to last at least 20 years 
(Chichava & Duran, 2016). 
 
The project is described as “perhaps Brazil’s and Japan’s most ambitious and headline-
catching initiative in the recent history of their international cooperation on African 
development projects” (Chichava & Durán, 2016, p. 2). The aims of the project are 
described as threefold: “improving and strengthening agricultural research and extension 
capacities; implementing pilot projects for small and commercial growers; and 
developing broader infrastructure to support the development of markets and 
commercial agriculture within the Nacala corrido” (Amanor & Chichava, 2016, p. 20). 
In the long run, the project should “lay the foundation for future Brazilian and Japanese 
investments by creating an agricultural infrastructure servicing different categories of 
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farmers”, which will “facilitate vertical linkages between input suppliers, farm 
producers, and food processors” (Amanor & Chichava, 2016, p. 20). Moreover, it has 
included business incentives “to encourage Brazilian and Japanese agribusiness to invest 
in Mozambique; to mobilize Japanese and Brazilian capital to support agribusiness 
developments, and to support farmer associations organized by Brazilian farmers to 
integrate small-holders into agribusiness value chains” (Chichava et al., 2013, as cited 
in Amanor & Chichava, 2016, p. 20).  
 
According to the non-profit organisation, foodtank (n.d.), the project was originally 
expected to transform “35 million hectares (nearly 100 million acres) of “underutilized” 
land to be converted by Brazilian agribusiness into soybean plantations for cheaper 
export to China and Japan”. Later studies state that the ProSAVANA project “is being 
implemented within a 14 million hectare area in the Nacala Corridor”, and that it would 
“directly support 400,000 small farmers and indirectly benefit 3.6 million agricultural 
workers” (Chichava & Durán, 2016, p. 15).  
 
The project sees Mozambique as the beneficiary country, while the roles of Japan and 
Brazil can be seen as both pivotal and provider countries. Both countries provide funding 
and technological know-how to the programme. However, the exports of the agricultural 
goods are aimed at the Japanese, and not Brazilian markets, while both Japanese and 
Brazilian agribusiness will make profits. In this way, this project seems to put into 
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question the Brazilian approach not to include commercial interests in its development 
programmes. 
 
The project has been hugely controversial, as civil society organisations in Mozambique 
question its developmental gains for the local population and farmers (Amanor & 
Chichava, 2016; Chichava & Durán, 2016; Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016; Mitchell, 
2016; da Silva, 2016). Civil society organisations in Mozambique claim that 
ProSAVANA “will mainly benefit Brazilian and Japanese capital, as well as the 
Mozambican elite, while marginalising local small farmers” (Chicava & Durán, 2016, 
p. 2). They “predict that ProSavana will instigate land grabs by foreign companies and 
migrant farmers, leading to a rural exodus”, as they did in the PRODECER project in 
Brazil decades earlier (p.2).  
 
The PRODECER project, which served as the basis for ProSAVANA, was made in an 
entirely different context. The cerrado region in Brazil had poor soil, and only few 
farmers, which the “then-military dictatorship” of Brazil could easily remove from the 
land (foodtank, n.d.). On the other hand, the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique is 
characterised by good soils, where agriculture does flourish, but maybe not at the extent 
that it could with better technologies. The good soils are “precisely why it is the most 
densely-populated part of rural Mozambique” (foodtank, n.d.). Moreover, Mozambique 
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“has one of the stronger land laws in Africa, which grants use rights to farmers who have 
been farming land for ten years or more” (foodtank, n.d.).  
 
The NO TO ProSAVANA National Campaign was started in Mozambique in May 2013 
by “over 20 Civil Society Organizations along with peasant, environmental and religious 
social movements, as well as families and communities from the Nacala Development 
Corridor” (farmlandgrab.org, 2014). These civil society organisations criticised the 
project for the scarce availability of information, non-transparency, lack of public debate 
and consultation regarding the adverse social, economic, and environmental impacts this 
project could have on millions of people (Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016).  
 
Although branded under a triangular development cooperation initiative, Mozambican 
CSOs regard the project as Brazilian and Japanese “neo-imperealism” and “neo-
colonialism” (Chicava & Durán, 2016, p. 2). This is of course a very unwanted image 
by both development partners, who “have grown wary of even discussing the program 
as the political cost of promoting it rises” (Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016, p. 43). While 
the restrictions of this paper do not allow for an in-depth analysis of all the controversies, 
and dialogue, which have caused the planning phase to slow-down, it is important to 
note that the programme planning is still ongoing, and expected to take place more 
concretely in one form or another at some point in the future. 
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Mitchell (2016) highlights how the ProSAVANA project contradicts the Brazilian 
approach to South-South cooperation, which is based on solidarity, non-tied aid, non-
conditionalities, and no commercial interests, as its “predominant focus on private 
investment and commercialisation of agricultural production” suggests a different 
approach (p. 31).  
 
While the ProSAVANA project does reflect the typical dimension of emerging donors 
promoting their own development experience, in this case Brazil’s experience in 
PRODECER, the costs at which these developments would come to local communities 
goes against the standards of development that are nowadays shared by both 
development actors from the global South and the OECD-DAC countries.  
 
As highlighted by Mitchell (2016), the ProSAVANA “does not appear to be in line with 
the principles of SSC, particularly that of achieving ‘common development’” (p. 32). In 
this way, while this project has not yet been implemented, it can be regarded as a failure 
of the Brazilian South-South cooperation approach to triangular development 
cooperation, as it does not fulfil the motivations that Brazil seems to highlight in its 
development practices, both in its discourse, and other TDC projects.  
 
The ProSAVANA approach seems to reflect the bilateral practices that China has been 
criticised of in its so-called ‘Angola-model’, where it ties its aid to the extraction of 
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natural resources, that will bring commercial benefits to itself. However, Brazil’s 
success in trilateral initiatives across other sectors do point to this project being an outlier 
of its generally amicable, and mutually beneficial, approach to South-South cooperation 
and TDC.  Some of the more successful initiatives will be described hereon. 
 
5.3.2 Brazil, Germany and Mozambique 
As in the previous case, this TDC project for protection from natural disasters saw 
Mozambique as the beneficiary country, Brazil as the pivotal country, and Germany as 
the provider country. As Mozambique is a country that is frequently struck by natural 
disasters, such as flooding and drought, due to irregular and changing levels of rainfall 
and frequent tropical cyclones, the objective of this disaster prevention management 
TDC project was “to put in place infrastructure that can be used to monitor risks and to 
forecast and manage emergency situations”, and for the Save and Buzi rivers to “have 
an early warning system and an effective disaster management system in place in order 
to prevent civilian casualties and minimise any economic damage caused by flooding” 
(GIZ, 2015). 
 
The Mozambican National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC), which is focused 
on designing preventative methods against natural disasters first entered cooperation 
with the German Development Agency (GIZ) in 2002 (GIZ, 2015). These partners were 
interested in including Brazil in a triangular format of cooperation, specifically due to 
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the “extensive experience” of the Brazilian Directorate for Hydrography and Navigation 
(DHN) and National Institute for Meteorology (INMET) “in forecasting the weather, 
flooding, and storm surges” (GIZ, 2015). The three countries entered a trilateral 
partnership in March 2012, with funding coming mainly from the GIZ’s Regional Fund 
for Triangular Cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean (GIZ, 2015).  
 
Running from 2013 to 2015, the project built “institutional capacities of Mozambique’s 
National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) and National Institute for 
Meteorology (INAM)” (GIZ, 2015). The Brazilian ABC was tasked with providing 
“funding for the construction of disaster preparedness and coordination centres”, and 
coordinating Brazilian actors, which included DHN, INMET, the National Water 
Agency (ANA), the Agronomic Institute of Campinas (IAC), the University of São 
Paulo and the Federal University of Alagoas, in sharing “their expertise in the field of 
weather forecasting, flood prevention and flood disaster preparedness (GIZ, 2015). From 
the German side, GIZ, the University of Applied Sciences Cologne and the German 
Meteorological Service (Deutscher Wetterdienst, DWD) worked “with the partners in 
the field of disaster preparedness and management, with a particular focus on rural 
regions” (GIZ, 2015).  
 
Because of this TDC initiative, “stations that automatically carry out climatological and 
hydrological measurements have been installed, as has a system for recording 
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hydrometeorological data. A significant number of technicians from Mozambique’s 
National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) and National Institute for 
Meteorology (INAM) have received training in disaster management and weather 
observation as well as in the use of maritime early warning systems” (GIZ, 2015).  
 
The project can be regarded as a trademark TDC project, where Brazil and Germany 
have cooperated and shared their knowledge in disaster prevention systems, by use of a 
variety of actors from both academic and governmental institutions. While both 
Germany and Brazil have supported the project with funding, Germany is regarded as 
the main provider country, as it is the primary source of funds, and the initial partner to 
Mozambique, who invited Brazil to share its technical know-how in the field. The results 
of the project have been positive, and have enhanced Mozambique’s natural disaster 
management awareness.  
 
5.3.3 Brazil, Canada, Norway, the IDB and Haiti  
This TDC project, called “Honour and Respect for Bel Air”, is aimed at promoting 
“security and development in the neighbourhood of Bel Air, Port-au-Prince, Haiti” 
(OECD, 2009b). The project is a partnership of the Haitian government, a Brazilian 
NGO named Viva Rio, the Brazilian embassy in Haiti, the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), and the Inter-American Development Bank. 
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While the Brazilin NGO and embassy are considered the pivotal actors, the Canadian 
and Norwegian actors, along with the IDB are considered the providers. The IDB, along 
with Canadian and Norwegian actors, provide the funding to the project (OECD, 2009b; 
Viva Rio, 2008). As Brazil has a lot of “expertise in dealing with armed violence and 
situations of urban precariousness”, it is considered as the pivotal country that leads the 
project’s implementation on the ground (p. 11). In fact, it is the Brazilian NGO, Viva 
Rio, that is considered as the leading actor in the project, while the Brazilian government, 
through its embassy, only “has a supportive and advisory role”, and it does not take part 
in implementation of the project (OECD, 2009b, p. 11).  
 
The mission of the project “is to reduce armed violence and promote urban rehabilitation, 
focusing on ensuring security, development and human rights of inhabitants” (OECD, 
2009b, p. 12). The areas of focus include “water supply, solid waste management and 
education”, with special attention associated with Viva Rio’s activities in peacekeeping, 
female empowerment, and educating the youth (OECD, 2009b, p. 11).  
 
The project has achieved success in the areas of “security, water distribution and solid 
waste management” (p. 11). Moreover, urban violence has been reduced, and the number 
of homicides has decreased (p. 11). The positive results are attributed to Viva Rio's focus 
on the single neighbourhood of Bel Air, rather than many areas of the city. In general, 
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many NGOs “disperse efforts over many neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince or the entire 
country, conducting many but very small interventions” (p. 11). 
 
This project exemplifies the diversity of sectors that the Brazilian approach to TDC 
entails. Moreover, the leading role played by an NGO allows for Brazil to broaden its 
horizon of TDC projects in an area (security), where governmental actors would be less 
inclined to take part in, as any problems or scandals could risk the country receiving bad 
press, and international condemnation. However, the success of the project, where 
international partners from Canada and Norway have oversight, has only raised the 
profile of Brazilian expertise in development initiatives in such less-explored sectors. 
 
5.3.4 Brazil, the UNDP and the World Bank, and several partner countries  
The Brazil Learning Initiative for a World Without Poverty (WWP), formed through a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the World Bank and Brazil in March 2013, is 
a TDC project involving the World Bank, the UNDP, the Brazilian Ministry of Social 
Development and the Fight against Hunger (MDS), the Brazilian Institute of Applied 
Economic Research (IPEA), International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), 
and several developed and developing countries (UNDP, 2016, p. 19). The main aim of 
the project is “to encourage knowledge exchange about social protection policies and 
initiatives to fight poverty” (WWP, 2017).  
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Brazil’s major steps forward in the reduction of inequality and poverty have been noted 
in the international community. Since its inception, “the WWP has surveyed, 
documented and disseminated” information on these “innovative solutions” in a variety 
of languages (WWP, 2017).  The project has seen 455 delegations arrive in Brazil from 
107 countries “to learn about topics such as conditional cash transfer programs, food and 
nutritional security, social welfare, productive inclusion, and monitoring and 
assessment” (WWP, 2017). 
 
The project is regarded as an initiative of the World Bank, where the core idea is to share 
information on the Brazilian development experience through “the World Bank’s 
renewed focus on the systematization of global development solutions, known as science 
of delivery” (p. 19). Policy-makers, researchers and the general public alike are able to 
learn about Brazil’s innovative solutions, such as its Bolsa Famillia social welfare 
programme, “through short, evidence-based studies and reference materials rather than 
lengthy documents” (UNDP, 2016, p. 19).  
 
To date, the WWP has published numerous reports, held “several events and seminars 
on monitoring and evaluation social policies and poverty eradication, and put together 
webinars and virtual Q&A sessions with short video messages” (UNDP, 2016, p. 20). 
While the WWP has not gone through an evaluation based on any systemised criteria, 
its knowledge sharing prowess has received positive feedback across partner countries 
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(UNDP, 2016). The downside is that certain developing countries may find it difficult 
to engage in such “web-based initiatives” (p. 21).  
 
WWP serves as a very innovative example of a triangular development cooperation 
project with multiple partners. The UNDP and World Bank are the main providers, who 
coordinate actors, and take care of managing the learning platform, and most 
sophisticated methods of disseminating information. The partner countries from both the 
developing and developed world have the opportunity to learn from this innovative, and 
virtually approachable pool of knowledge of a country that has proven its success in the 
development of social protection policies.  
 
Finally, Brazil is the pivotal partner, which shares its knowledge and experience of 
development in social protection in a manner very characteristic to South-South 
cooperation, where mutual learning and reciprocity is valued. The fact that Brazil was 
approached by the World Bank to play the role of the pivotal country, which other 
developing countries could learn from, through this new and modernised initiative, gives 
Brazil international prestige, and a reputation of a legitimate actor in international 
development, whose policies offer something for both developing and developed 
countries to learn from. 
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6. Analysis 
 
The previous two chapters have examined the development regimes of China and Brazil 
by focusing on the main actors, modalities, motivations, and constraints that their 
participation in TDC entails. This analysis has shown that China is less active than Brazil 
in Triangular Development Cooperation. Their differences in these areas are summarised 
in Table 1. A more detailed version of this Table is found in Appendix C. 
 
This table serves as the backdrop for this section, which answers the research question: 
Why is China less active than Brazil in Triangular Development Cooperation?   
 
This chapter uses the theories of neorealism and social-constructivism, and a hybrid 
between them, to understand the differences between the approaches to TDC taken by 
China and Brazil. The main differences between their approaches are listed in Table 2. 
Thereon, the constraints to China’s limited approach to TDC are discussed in detail, and 
listed in Table 3. Furthermore, the relationship between the theories of neorealism and 
social-construcitivism, and the Chinese and Brazilian approaches to TDC are visualised 
in a table format in Appendices A and B. Lastly, this chapter tests the hypotheses 
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Table 1. China and Brazil in Triangular Development Cooperation 
TDC China Brazil 
Activity Low High 
Actors 
State centered (State Council and 
Ministries) 
President, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), 
and a variety of others  
Modalities 
- health and agriculture 
- tied aid 
- predominately UN-led 
initiatives, rather than 
partnerships with OECD-DAC 
donors 
- Many sectors (agriculture, 








- promoting China-model of 
development 
- preference for TDC with 
multilateral organisations, 
rather than OECD-DAC donors 
 
- shaping global governance of 
development aid 
- enhancing global image as 
representative and leader of 
of global South 
- expanding development aid 
portfolio 
Constraints 
- lack of communication 
between government ministries 
- reluctance to standardize 
guidelines of monitoring and 
evaluation of development 
impacts 
- lack of trust and skepticism 
towards traditional donors 
- no legal basis for 
development cooperation 
- lack of development aid 
budget 
- institutional fragmentation 
- high staff turnover in ABC 
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6.1 Main Findings 
 
The main reasons to China’s limited approach to TDC in comparison to Brazil are listed 
below, in Table 2. 
Table 2. China’s Limited Approach to TDC in Comparison to Brazil 








development make it a 
less viable partner for 




Democratic power, active in 
international development 
cooperation. Its 
development regime is 
pluralistic in its modalities 
(from bilateral to tri- and 
multilateral engagements), 
with many actors across 
sectors and regions 
 
 
Model of South-South 
cooperation 
interest-based 
diplomacy, where its 
participation in 
international 
development is largely 
constrained to seeking 
material gains for itself 
value-based diplomacy, 
where its active 
participation in international 
development sees its 
promote the values of the 
global South.  







development aid  
High activity in shaping and 
building the institutions and 
modalities of global 





High lack of trust and 
scepticism, which has 
resulted in minimum 
engagements in TDC 
with OECD-DAC 
donors 
While scepticism and lack 
of trust prevail, Brazil has 
been active in engaging in 
TDC with a variety of 




Reluctance to accept 
systematised 
international standards 
for monitoring and 
evaluating development 
aid projects  
Slow to accept systematised 
international standards for 
monitoring and evaluating 
development aid projects  
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The following segment discusses the main roots of these limitations, and difference in 
the Chinese and Brazilian approaches to TDC, as depicted in Table 2, through the lenses 
of neorealism and social-constructivism. Thereon, section 6.2.2 delves deeper into these 
limitations, and reflects further on the theories of neorealism and social-constructivism 
to explain the constraints to China’s participation in TDC. 
 
There is an interesting duality in China’s approach to international relations. China can 
be regarded as a superpower that has reached peaceful development through its China-
model, which it has also sought to pass on to other developing countries through South-
South cooperation and knowledge sharing. This is reflected in a China that wants to 
share ideas and build bridges in a way that resonates a social-constructivist view on 
international relations. On the other hand, China’s actions on the international stage can 
be understood through the neorealist perspective, particularly in relation to its strong 
stance on issues such as the East China Sea dispute, which depicts a country not shying 
away from using hard power tools to get its way in the anarchic international system.  
 
Furthermore, its creation of organisations, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank, seem to directly compete with previously established western ones, and as such, 
can be regarded as ways for China to increase or maintain its relative balance of power 
in the international system. Moreover, as China’s role as a growing superpower is still 
very new, the international community is yet to completely understand China, and does 
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not know exactly what kind of behaviour can be expected from it. This may lead to China 
being left without any options other than looking at the world from a neorealist 
perspective, as the perception of other countries towards it also make cooperation and 
constructive relationship-building more difficult. This perception of China is a major 
reason for why China’s role in international development cooperation, and other facets 
of international cooperation, differs from that of Brazil.  
 
China is regarded as an authoritarian one-party superpower, which has been progressive 
in many of its reforms in the past years. Nevertheless, the oppressive nature of the regime 
in areas, such as human rights and political freedoms, are frowned upon in OECD-DAC 
countries, who are still the main providers of development aid, and its governance on a 
worldwide stage.  
 
Brazil, as a relatively stable democratic country, and a growing regional power, is, on 
the other hand, considered a country that is much more open to dialogue, and willing to 
learn from the practices of the the West in both matters related to development and 
further afield. Brazil’s approach to international development cooperation, and other 
facets of international relations, seem to follow a social-constructivist perspective, where 
it actively interacts with other countries in a multitude of areas of interest to construct 
new facets of cooperation, and shape an identity of itself as an active, and reckonable 
power, on the world stage. Brazil has gained a positive reputation for its engagement in 
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international forums, and is regarded as a very peaceful and diplomatic actor in 
international relations. Hence, Brazil’s starting position in entering triangular 
cooperation with traditional donors is relatively easier compared with that of China. 
 
Furthermore, the differing approaches of Brazil and China towards triangular 
development cooperation stem from their already differing approaches towards South-
South cooperation. It seems that Brazil’s approach to triangular development 
cooperation entails a model of South-South cooperation that is built on value-based 
diplomacy. This approach sees Brazil seeking a role as the spokesperson of the global 
South, where it promotes values of South-South cooperation by constructing bridges of 
dialogue, and shaping new institutions for cooperation, between the global North and 
global South. This is linked to its role as an open, democratic country, which is willing 
to learn and is flexible in its approaches to global cooperation.  
 
Conversely, China’s approach to triangular development cooperation entails a model of 
South-South cooperation that is built on interest-based diplomacy. China will engage 
with any kinds of regimes across sectors in developing countries, if this cooperation is 
in its material interests (material gains), which reflects a neorealist perspective. 
Moreover, China’s approach highlights its own rigid model for development, which it 
seeks to highlight as a strictly different model to those of OECD-DAC donors. China is 
not flexible and open in its approach to international cooperation in the same way as 
 
 - 105 - 
Brazil. However, its recent engagements in triangular development cooperation show 
glimpses of a China that is willing to alter its development practices to build a different 
image of itself, one where material gains are not as important. This approach reflects a 
social-constructivist perspective on TDC. 
 
In terms of political goals, China and Brazil also differ in the way their development 
cooperation activities are linked to their foreign policy goals. China’s development 
cooperation is very tightly linked to its foreign policy objectives, which are often linked 
to material gains (extraction of resources), and political gains (support from developing 
countries in international forums). The command structure that is centralised on Beijing, 
sees the MFA or MOFCOM, involved in each phase of their development projects, either 
through their local embassies, public officials working in SOEs, or other methods, to 
make sure that development cooperation initiatives in partner countries are enacted in 
certain ways.  
 
While the main actor authoring the path of Brazil’s development cooperation is the 
President, Brazil’s development actors, from the MFA and ABC to NGOs and other 
private actors, are more loosely controlled in their development practices. While this 
may not be a deliberate decision by the government, as it may be a result of poor 
coordination and institutional weaknesses, it could be one of the reasons why Brazil’s 
development regime has become so pluralistic in the modalities and sectors that it 
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conducts development cooperation in. In fact, the polarity of actors in Brazilian 
cooperation may further allow it to build networks and models of triangular development 
cooperation that may not be influenced by the state at all. 
 
 
6.2 Constraints to China’s Participation in TDC  
 
This section details the main constraints to China’s limited approach to triangular 
development cooperation, and further elaborates on the factors that were presented in 
Table 2. The main constraints to China’s approach to TDC are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. 
Constraints to China's Approach to Triangular Development Cooperation 
Disregard towards shaping global governance of international development aid  
Lack of trust towards traditional donors  
Emphasis on China-model, and bilateral cooperation, is a constraint to TDC 
Reluctance to accept systematized international standards for monitoring and 
evaluating development aid projects  
 
6.2.1 China’s Disregard Towards Global Governance of Development Aid  
China’s reluctance towards taking a more active role in triangular development 
cooperation seems to stem from its disregard towards playing a key role in shaping the 
global aid regime. China is focused on promoting its so-called ‘China model’ through 
bilateral means of development cooperation. This model is a major aspect of Chinese 
South-South cooperation, and usually involves tied aid practices, where China brings the 
know-how and resources to implement a developmental project in exchange for the 
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extraction of certain natural resources from the recipient country. This model can best 
be understood through a neorealist perspective on international relations, where China’s 
actions are based on increasing its material relative gains in the international order. The 
model is a very pragmatic approach to development, and highlights development 
effectiveness over aid effectiveness. In this way, it focuses on triggering a variety of 
developmental outcomes, rather than focusing on certain development goals. However, 
as China does not have a systemised method for evaluating its developmental activities, 
it is difficult to assert the developmental impact of its development cooperation.  
 
While TDC’s proportion of China’s total development aid activity is still minute, China 
has been involved in an increased amount of TDC over the past years. Its increased 
activity, particularly in TDC with multilateral organisations, is motivated by its desire 
to enhance its global image, rather than the promotion of TDC per se, as a tool to bridge 
the practices of North-South and South-South donors. In this way, China uses TDC to 
shape its own image in the international arena, while it does not engage in TDC to shape 
the facets of global governance. As relative gains in terms of material are less evident in 
this kind of engagement, it seems that China’s engagement in TDC with multilateral 
organisations is based on its agenda to shape an image of itself as a more responsible 
and influential actor in multilateral forums, which relates to a social-constructivist 
perspective on international relations. 
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Here, Brazil’s approach to development aid differs most fundamentally to China’s. 
While Brazil also takes part in triangular development cooperation to enhance its global 
image, its proactivity in TDC is also based on its desire to play a very active and 
important role in authoring and shaping the new modalities, institutions and structures 
of the global development regime. It regards triangular development cooperation as one 
of the core facets of an emerging aid regime, where practices of both traditional donors 
and South-South cooperation merge. This is evident in how Brazil has overwhelmingly 
been the main pivotal partner in TDC projects. Moreover, Brazil has been very active in 
all kinds of tri- and multilateral development cooperation initiatives across sectors and 
regions, as its strategy seems to be being present in as many locations and possible. This 
strategy allows it to learn, influence, and support different modalities of development 
cooperation from an early stage, while the experience of taking part in a vast array of 
development cooperation across sectors and regions also gives its development practices 
legitimacy. The way in which Brazil seeks to play an important role in constructing a 
new global aid architecture, while simultaneously shaping an image of itself as an active 
partner in cooperation, fits well into the idea of Brazil seeing international development 
cooperation from a social-constructivist perspective. 
 
6.2.2 China’s Lack of Trust Towards Traditional Donors 
While China has asserted that it sees TDC as a promising way to share knowledge and 
promote both South-South and North-South cooperation, its lack of trust and scepticism 
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towards engaging with OECD-DAC donors has constrained its activity in TDC. Such 
trust issues resonate a neorealist perspective on TDC, where China sees other countries 
as threats to, in this case, its developmental model. It is not ready to actively, or 
consciously, engage in TDC in a more constructive manner, where its activity and role 
would both shape, and be shaped, by other actors in the global development arena. 
Moreover, the fact that China’s development activities remain highly concentrated in 
bilateral cooperation show that its neorealist perspective to development aid, which is 
based on maximising relative material gains, rather than the shaping of an identity or 
new facets of development cooperation (constructivist perspective), remains dominant. 
 
According to the neorealist perspective, China sees other states as the main threat to its 
survival in the international regime, and is very sceptical about cooperating with them 
in TDC. In fact, China sees the OECD-DAC states’ models of development cooperation 
as a direct threat to the China-model that it wishes to promote. As triangular development 
cooperation is an area where relative gains are harder to achieve, or to clearly be 
distinguished, China prefers not to engage in TDC projects that involve traditional 
OECD-DAC donors. Instead, it cooperates in TDC with international organisations, such 
as the UN’s FAO, or UNDP, in areas such as agriculture and food security, where it can 
increase the visibility of its China model in international forums, without being put into 
a directly competitive environment with other states. Furthermore, it seems that China’s 
approach to TDC with multilateral organisations rests on a social-constructivist 
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perspective, where such non-competitive engagement gives it a stage to build an image 
of itself as an altruistic and responsible global superpower, with an alternative model to 
development.  
 
As the case studies have shown, China has also cooperated with countries like the USA 
and Australia in TDC. This cooperation seems to have occurred in a form, where the 
traditional donors have been on an equal footing, with similar responsibilities to China. 
In this way, China wants to portray itself as an equal partner with OECD-DAC countries, 
which refuses to be dominated by their long-standing models of how development aid 
should be delivered and governed. 
 
To summarise, it seems that there is a duality, where China’s engagement in bilateral 
development cooperation with recipient countries, or TDC with OECD-DAC countries, 
is based on a neorealist approach, where it requires such cooperation to bring it relative 
gains, or to maintain the balance of power. However, its engagement in TDC with 
multilateral organisations seems to be based on a social-constructivist approach, where 
it can promote its China-model in a non-competitive environment, and build an identity 
of itself as an altruistic and responsible actor in development.  
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6.2.3 China’s Bilateral Model as a Constraint to TDC 
As reiterated on numerous occasions throughout the thesis, China’s development 
cooperation is largely based on its bilateral, so-called China model. Its emphasis on this 
model, and eagerness to promote it as a distinct alternative to other models of 
development cooperation can by itself be regarded as a constraint to its participation in 
TDC.  
 
The neorealist approach is clearly visible in its bilateral development cooperation, which 
highlights relative material gains, and direct benefits to China. As bilateral development 
cooperation remains the core facet of Chinese development cooperation, it can be stated 
that China’s approach to triangular development cooperation is also constrained by the 
very fact that it prefers bilateral engagements, as such engagement reaps it direct, relative 
gains.  
 
While TDC is about bringing together the comparative advantages in practices and 
knowledge of both traditional providers of aid, and emerging donors, to the benefit of 
recipient countries, it is a facet of cooperation that both scholars and policy-makers have 
regarded as a testing ground, from which new models and guidelines for a global 
development aid architecture could be generated. As China is adamant about keeping its 
China model as an alternative to such platforms of convergence, it is less attracted to 
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take part in such cooperation, unless it can clearly promote its own model of 
development in a horizontal way.  
 
Nevertheless, it seems that its increased engagement in TDC, and statements regarding 
the benefits of mutual learning, may be altering its stance to being more open to learning 
about best practices in development cooperation. This is particularly relevant to its 
global image building, where it may want to involve aspects of traditional donors’ 
practices to tweak its China model. Moreover, the traditional donors have time and again 
highlighted that they also have a lot of positive aspects to learn from China’s practices 
of South-South cooperation, which may allow China to be more forthcoming towards 
TDC engagements. 
 
6.2.4 China’s Reluctance to Accept International Standards  
Another element related to China’s lacking approach to TDC is its reluctance to accept 
international standards or guidelines regarding the monitoring or evaluation of 
development projects. In its bilateral engagements, it abides by negotiated guidelines on 
a more ad hoc project-basis, instead of creating guidelines for best practices that it could 
generally follow. While it seems to abide by the guidelines set forth to it in TDC with 
multilateral organisations, it is less willing to modify its behaviour in cooperation with 
traditional OECD-DAC donors, as this could lend to the idea that China is converging 
to their models of development aid governance. 
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6.3 Hypotheses Testing 
 
While hypothesis I is based on neorealism, and depicts China as having a neorealist 
approach to triangular development cooperation, hypothesis II is based on social-
constructivism, and depicts Brazil as having a social-constructivist approach to 
triangular development cooperation.  
 
6.3.1 The Neorealist Approach to TDC 
The first hypothesis introduced in the methodology relates to the neorealist theory on 
international relations. It is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis I) China participates in triangular development cooperation when it 
increases its relative gains, security, and material and political power in the international 
arena positively 
 
This hypothesis relates to the neorealist point of view on international relations, whereby 
China’s less active approach to triangular development cooperation stems from a 
paradigm on international relations, where the competitive environment between states 
means that its actions in development need to align with its foreign policy objectives of 
maintaining or growing its material and economic wealth. As such gains are less evident 
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in triangular development cooperation, China sticks to more bilateral forms of 
development aid. 
 
The findings in this thesis support a modified Hypothesis I. The thesis finds that China 
does link its foreign policy to its developmental aid. China sees the world predominately 
from a neorealist perspective, where it is ready to use hard power, and other coercive 
means to maximise its relative gains, and maintain its balance of power. However, 
China’s approach towards triangular development cooperation has seen it act in ways 
that could be well understood from both neorealist and constructivist perspectives. While 
its bilateral cooperation is based on materialist needs, such as the extraction of natural 
resources, which relate to neorealism, its TDC cooperation is also based on shaping an 
image of a more cooperative China, where relative gains are not that important. This is 
particularly relevant when China engages in TDC with multilateral organisations, as 
presented in section 6.2.2. 
 
China is more likely to participate in TDC when it does not undermine its position 
relative to other development actors, or it does not feel threatened by other actors, such 
as OECD-DAC donors. However, it also participates in TDC to build an image of itself 
as an altruistic, cooperative actor. In this way, the thesis supports the idea that China’s 
engagement in TDC can be seen from a hybrid of factors that pertain to both neorealist 
and social-constructivist theories of international relations. 
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6.3.2 The Social-Constructivist Approach to TDC 
The second hypothesis introduced in the methodology relates to the social-constructivist 
theory on international relations. It is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis II) Brazil participates in triangular development cooperation in order to 
shape the new values, norms and forms of global governance in development, and to 
construct its own identity as an active and cooperative global power that speaks for the 
global South. 
 
The findings in this thesis support this hypothesis. It acknowledges that Brazil’s active 
role in triangular development cooperation stems from a social-constructivist paradigm, 
where its strategy is to interact and cooperate with other partners to construct ideas and 
identities of itself as a strong southern partner that is active in creating and modifying 
facets of global governance. While Brazil donates aid for altruistic reasons, it also has 
its foreign policy interests at hand. 
 
6.4 A Neorealist – Social-Constructivist Hybrid Approach 
 
The thesis asserts that a hybrid between these two theories is a more relevant way to 
understand why China is less active than Brazil in triangular development cooperation. 
The neorealist perspective is able to understand why China prioritises a bilateral 
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approach to TDC, and is sceptical about TDC with traditional OECD-DAC partners. 
However, it is unable to encompass all the factors that explain why China has engaged 
in TDC with multilateral organisations in TDC. Here, China participates in TDC to build 
a better image of itself as a globally responsible actor in development, who plays an 





This thesis contributes to filling the academic gap in scholarly literature on the 
increasingly important role that triangular development cooperation is expected to take 
in the changing field of international development. It offers insights, analysis and a 
comparison of the roles that two of the biggest emerging donors from the global South, 
China and Brazil, are taking in the changing global development architecture. To answer 
the question, why is China less active than Brazil in triangular development cooperation, 
the thesis compared the actors, modalities, motivations and constraints of Chinese and 
Brazilian approaches to triangular development cooperation, and related these 
approaches to the international relations theories of neorealism and social-
constructivism. It found five key aspects of to explain why China is less active than 
Brazil in triangular development cooperation. 
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First, it found that China’s approach is more limited to that of Brazil’s, due to its 
governance structure being rigidly state-centered, and focused on bilateral development 
cooperation, and promoting the China model. Here, Brazil, as a democratic county, has 
a more flexible approach to development aid, as a plurality of its development actors 
take part in a multitude of aid modalities, which include triangular development 
cooperation.  
 
Second, it found that China’s model of South-South cooperation is based on interest-
based diplomacy, where it mainly partakes in international development cooperation to 
increase its material gains, whereas Brazil’s value-based approach causes it to be more 
active in promoting its values through development cooperation.  
 
Third, China and Brazil differ in their desire to shape global governance of development 
aid. China sticks adamantly to its bilateral China model of development cooperation, and 
does not take an active role in shaping the norms of global governance of development 
aid through triangular development cooperation. Brazil sees triangular development 
cooperation as a core tool for it to fulfil its agenda to take an active role in shaping the 
facets of global governance in international development aid.  
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Fourth, China is far more skeptical of triangular development cooperation with 
traditional donors than Brazil, as it sees it as a way for traditional donors to coopt it into 
their well-established norms of what development aid should entail.  
 
Lastly, China is very reluctant to accept international standards of monitoring and 
evaluation of development aid, and prefers to enact different standards on an ad hoc 
basis. Here, Brazil has also been slow to institutionalize international standards, while 
its active role in development cooperation has nonetheless allowed it to take part in a 
huge amount of triangular development cooperation. 
 
Furthermore, the thesis finds that while China’s approach to development cooperation is 
mainly based on a neorealist perspective, it seems to employ a social-constructivist 
approach to triangular development cooperation, particularly when it conducts TDC with 
international organisations. In such TDC arrangements, China seeks to enhance its 
global image, and portray itself as a responsible actor in development. It does not engage 
in such arrangements solely for material gains, as it often does in its bilateral 
engagements. However, it is important to note that China still overwhelmingly engages 
in bilateral development cooperation, where the neorealist perspective prevails, as TDC 
represents only a small fraction of its development portfolio. 
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Brazil’s approach to development cooperation seems to be based on a social-
constructivist perspective, where it seeks to enhance its image and identity as a 
cooperative international actor, with an eagerness to shape new facets of international 
development cooperation. In this way, it is very active in participating in many different 
modes of cooperation across regions and sectors. While its approach is predominately 
social-constructivist, where material gains, or commercial interests, do not play an 
important part, its engagement in projects, such as ProSAVANA, seem to show a side 
of Brazil that sometimes may seek to make material gains as well.  
 
The approaches of China and Brazil towards triangular development cooperation also 
reflect their stances on other issues in the international arena. China’s stance on respect 
for sovereignty, and non-interference, is structured around its own context, where its 
path to development and economic growth was different to the models of governance 
and development that are promoted by the West and western-dominated institutions. In 
this way, it does not disguise its reluctance to hear other powers criticize the way it does 
things, particularly in the areas of human rights and political freedoms. Thus, it promotes 
its China model as a distinct model to the development practices of OECD-DAC donors.  
 
Brazil, as a regional power, and democracy, is renowned for its diplomatic prowess, and 
engagements in international forums in a variety of issue areas, such as peace-keeping, 
conflict resolution, and development. While it sees itself as a voice and advocate of the 
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global South, it is much more open-minded to dialogue, criticism, and learning from 
other countries, than China. This seems to be one of the core elements that allows it to 
take an active role in such a wide array of international cooperation, such as triangular 
development cooperation.  
 
Looking to the future, it seems that Brazil will continue to pursue an active role in 
triangular development cooperation, with the aim to make permanent changes in the 
global development architecture. China can be expected to maintain its cautious 
approach towards triangular development cooperation, while the changes in the 
international system at large, may allow it to take a more active role in the future. 
Furthermore, as China’s importance in global affairs grows, its development actors can 
be expected to take a more serious approach towards enhancing their global image as a 
more socially, environmentally, and politically responsible actors. In this way, its ‘China 
model’ can also be expected to entail features that resemble western guidelines in 
development, as China seeks to further the outreach of its development practices. 
 
While an increased amount of triangular development cooperation can be expected to 
create new and more standardised guidelines and forms of evaluating development 
impacts across traditional and emerging donors, there is no guarantee that initiatives, 
like the GPEDC, will evolve into more important and internationally inclucive facets of 
global governance of development aid. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A. Neorealism and (Triangular) Development Cooperation 









China’s vehement stance on 
numerous issues, such as the 
disputes in the East China Sea, 
depict a power that is ready to 
side-line cooperation, 
international agreements, and 
dialogue on issues it considers 
threatening to the maintenance of 
its balance of power 
Brazil is renowned for its 
diplomatic prowess, activeness in 
peacekeeping, conflict-
resolution, and role as a regional 
interlocutor. Its conformity with 
international norms and 
obligations, and activity in 
international cooperation, reflect 
a country that is not concerned 









- Bilateral development 
cooperation entails close 
communication between 
local embassies and 
recipient governments, 
allowing China to make 
political and material 
gains. 
- tied aid practices reflect 
material interests 
- development 
cooperation a foreign 
policy tool to gain 
support for global 
objectives.  
- Brazil's development 
regime is based on non-
commerciality and non-
material gains.  
- politically, it sees 
development 
cooperation as a tool to 
strengthen its ties with 
developing countries, to 
gain more support for its 
ambitions in 
international 
organisations, such as 















China can enhance its 
international profile in a 
non-rival environment.  
- Generally, refrains from 
TDC with OECD-DAC 
partners, as it sees them 
as competitors 
 
- TDC participation not 
linked to seeking 
material gains 
- TDC a tool to reach 
foreign policy 
aspirations of becoming 
an increasingly 
respected, active, and 
important global power 
 
Distrust towards 
other states  
Scepticism towards OECD-DAC 
donors due to suspicion about 
their ambitions to co-opt it into 
their development aid regime 
Sceptcism towards OECD-DAC 
donors, but remains open to 
cooperation with them. 
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APPENDIX B. Social-Constructivism and (Triangular) Development 
Cooperation 






political order is 
socially constructed, 
and based on ideas 
derived from human 
nature, values, norms, 
and behavioural 
patterns 
Interest-based approach to 
international political order 
sees international relations as a 
zero-sum game, where its 
optimal goal is survival. 
However, it seeks to create an 
image of the China model as a 
viable alternative to western-
dominated models of 
development.  
Value-based approach to 
international politics involves 
promotion of norms and values 
of global South in all spheres of 
international cooperation. 
Brazil is a strong advocate of 
diplomacy, international 
cooperation, and peacekeeping, 
and seems coherent in its 
behavior in international arenas 
 
The identities of states 
cause them to produce 
different kinds of 
effects in International 
Development 
Identity in developmetn is 
narrowly focused on promoting 
the China-model. However, the 
huge increase of its 
development aid has created 
tensions in the international 
development arena. 
Identity of an open-minded and 
cooperative actor have allowed 
it to shape many kinds of 
modalities of development 





Approach to TDC is 






China's approach to TDC is 
shaped by both material and 
immaterial factors, as it seeks to 
reap both material gains, and to 
enhance its global image. 
Brazil's approach to TDC is 
largely shaped by immaterial 
gains, as it hopes to shape the 
global aid regime, and be 
respected as a cooperative 
partner in international 
relations. However, while it 
emphasises non-commerciality 
of its TDC projects, projects like 
ProSAVANA have seen it seek 





perception of itself 
and how it is 
perceived by others 
explain its engagement 
in TDC 
Both China's perception, and 
traditional donors' perception of 
China, is based on scepticism of 
ulterior motives within their 
TDC engagements. This is 
largely related to other spheres 
of international affairs, where 
the West and China clash. This 
makes it hard for the countries 
to build trust 
While Brazil is sceptical of 
traditional donors' motives in 
co-opting it into their 
framework of development aid, 
traditional donors have been 
very willing to cooperate with it 
in all kinds of development 
projects. Brazil is a democratic 
country, and its relations with 




 - 132 - 
APPENDIX C. China and Brazil in Triangular Development Cooperation (detailed) 
TDC China Brazil 
Activity Low High 
Actors 
State Council, the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) 
President, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), 
private actors, NGOs and public 
research institutions  
Modalities 
- knowledge sharing 
- health and agriculture 
- tied aid 
- predominately UN-led 
initiatives (rather than 
partnerships with OECD-DAC 
donors) 
- TDC with traditional donors 
only when provider/pivotal 
division is horizontal  
- technical cooperation 
(includes knowledge sharing) 
- Many sectors (agriculture, 
health, education, security, 
administrative capacity 
building...) 
- TDC partnerships with both 





- mutual learning  
- enhancing global image 
- promoting China-model of 
development 
- foreign policy objectives 
- preference for TDC with 
multilateral organisations, 
rather than OECD-DAC donors 
- participation in TDC more 
likely when ownership of 
recipient country assured 
- mutual learning 
- enhancing global image as 
representative of global South 
- shaping global governance of 
development aid 
- promotion of technical 
cooperation 
- expanding development aid 
portfolio 
- strengthening role as regional 
leader 
- other diplomatic and foreign 
policy objectives 
Constraints 
- lack of communication 
between government ministries 
- reluctance to standardize 
guidelines of monitoring and 
evaluation of development 
impacts 
- lack of trust and skepticism 
towards traditional donors 
- no legal basis for 
development cooperation 
- lack of development aid 
budget 
- institutional fragmentation 
with plurality of actors 
- high staff turnover in ABC 
- no evaluation system 
- skepticism towards 
traditional donors 
 
